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ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR—
CONSTITUTIONAL TORT SUITS AS TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIATION VEHICLES 
George D. Brown∗ 
Abstract 
 
This Article examines the role of civil suits in providing accountability 
for the Bush administration’s conduct of the “war on terror.” There have 
been calls for a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission” to perform this 
function, almost like a retroactive impeachment of President Bush. For 
now, the idea appears to be dead, especially since many of the policies 
have continued under President Obama. Increasingly, the default 
accountability mechanism for questioning government conduct is the array 
of civil suits against federal officials by self-proclaimed victims of the war, 
cases which might be referred to as reverse war on terror suits. Many of 
these suits are high profile, including Ashcroft v. Iqbal, Padilla v. Yoo, and 
Arar v. Ashcroft.  
These suits often fail at the threshold. This Article examines the 
specific reasons for these failures—including the Bivens doctrine, qualified 
immunity, and the state secrets privilege—and explores their underlying 
causes. It identifies both a systemic hesitation to use the tort suit as a 
vehicle for questioning government policy and an enhanced hesitation 
when the policy involves national security, an area of high judicial 
deference to the government. In addition to these problems, the Article 
concludes that the suits, like the commission proposal, suffer from the 
same retributive motivation and premises. The legal climate that reverse 
war on terror suits face may become more receptive. Perhaps, however, the 
goal of accountability should be re-examined and sought through other 
means. 
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It has always been true that a real accounting of the Bush 
administration’s abuses is vital if Mr. Obama truly wants to 
repair them and try to prevent them from recurring. It is more 
important than ever now, when the Republican right is trying 
hard to turn the clock back to those dark times by painting 
Democrats as “soft on terror” during an election year. 
 
–The New York Times** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Long after George W. Bush left office, his administration’s anti-
terrorism efforts remain the subject of intense controversy. Supporters, led 
by former Vice President Dick Cheney, insist that the strong measures of 
the war on terror were necessary to keep the nation safe.1 Opponents, led 
by the New York Times, denounce these efforts as unconstitutional 
violations of civil liberties and an abandonment of fundamental American 
values.2 The division is deep; the debate continues.  
                                                                                                                     
**
 Editorial, Seven Paragraphs, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at A20. 
 1. Joseph Williams & Bryan Bender, Obama and Cheney Clash on the Fight Against 
Terror, BOS. GLOBE, May 22, 2009, at A1. 
 2. Editorial, One Hundred, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2009, at A22 (“[President Obama] needs to 
rethink . . . his opposition to a full public inquiry to determine why, how and by whom so many 
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Some have called for a national inquiry into the war on terror.3 Their 
general goal is “accountability,” and the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission is the apparent model.4 Fault on the part of the 
Bush administration is assumed. Prominent among the specific goals of 
any such commission would be determining what policies were at the 
center of the war on terror, what governmental actions rose to the level of 
constitutional violations, and how to prevent such errors from occurring in 
the future.5 To this date, however, no commission has been established. 
Indeed, the formation of any such body seems increasingly unlikely. There 
are several reasons why this is so. 
First, the war on terror continues. Observers from different ends of the 
political spectrum have noted, sometimes with chagrin, the degree to which 
President Barack Obama has kept in place policies and practices of his 
predecessor.6 Another reason is that the widely touted South African model 
is singularly inappropriate.7 America is not emerging from a civil war. We 
have not changed our form of government. Controversial though it may be, 
the Bush administration’s war on terror did not leave permanent scars on a 
large swath of the body politic. Perhaps the major reason why calls for an 
American Truth and Reconciliation Commission have foundered is a 
fundamental ambiguity about the role of the body. Is it an inquiry into what 
policies have been followed to combat terrorism and whether they should 
be continued in the future (mindful of the need to balance national security 
with concerns for individual liberties)? Or is it an exposé of what the Bush 
administration did wrong, assuming guilt and apportioning blame? The 
former might be called the inquiry model; the latter the retributive model. 
The emphasis of proponents like Senator Patrick Leahy on retribution8 has 
hobbled the effort from the start. Not surprisingly, the political system has 
resisted calls for a retroactive impeachment.  
The thesis of this Article is that, despite the lack of a formal 
commission, we already have an accountability mechanism that operates 
with increasing frequency and prominence: the tort suits brought by self-
proclaimed victims of the war on terror against present and former 
government officials. Grievances have included extraordinary rendition,9 
                                                                                                                     
orders were given to violate the law and the most cherished Constitutional rights.”). 
 3. E.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Time to Come Clean, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2009, at 
WK14. 
 4. See Senator Patrick Leahy, Restoring Trust in the Justice System: The Senate Judiciary 
Committee’s Agenda in the 111th Congress, Remarks at the Marver H. Bernstein Symposium on 
Governmental Reform at Georgetown University (Feb. 9, 2009), available at http://www.truth-
out.org/021009K (invoking the South African experience). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, To Critics, New Policy on Terror Looks Like Old, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 2, 2009, at A14. 
 7. See Jack M. Balkin, Op-Ed., A Body of Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2009, at WK11.  
 8. See Leahy, supra note 4. 
 9. See, e.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 563 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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unauthorized surveillance,10 conditions of confinement,11 and unauthorized 
detention.12 Defendants have ranged from the former Attorney General and 
the Director of the FBI to corrections officials and prison guards.13 Some 
of the suits in question are high profile, such as the action by “enemy 
combatant” Jose Padilla against former Bush Justice Department official 
John Yoo.14 Beyond compensation, there is also often a broader, political 
dimension. For example, Padilla sought damages of $1 in his suit based on 
injuries to constitutional rights flowing, ultimately, from Yoo’s advice to 
other government officials.15 
Such actions might be referred to as reverse war on terror suits. Instead 
of the government bringing a criminal proceeding against a suspected 
terrorist, former suspects sue officials in civil, usually tort, actions. 
However, as this Article will develop, reverse war on terror suits face a 
striking number of obstacles. There is an array of doctrines that seriously 
constrain their availability. Finding a right of action is an initial constraint, 
particularly given the limits on constitutional tort suits brought under the 
doctrine derived from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics.16 The Bivens doctrine is the principal means of 
getting reverse war on terror suits into court. Alternative causes of action 
are difficult to establish.17 Getting past this stage is only the beginning. 
Official defendants will enjoy qualified immunity, preventing many suits 
from being heard.18  Even if denied, the immunity defense can tie a lawsuit 
into knots since the denial is subject to appeal under the collateral order 
doctrine.19 Attempts to hold high-level officials liable will encounter 
problems of limits on supervisory liability, especially after the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.20 Assertions of the state secrets 
privilege can limit the plaintiff’s suit or block the suit altogether.21 It is true 
that in Marbury v. Madison,22 Chief Justice John Marshall declared that 
                                                                                                                     
 10. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 494 F.3d 139, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 11. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1944 (2009). 
 12. See, e.g., Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98). 
 13. See, e.g., Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943. 
 14. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 15. First Amended Complaint at 21, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) 
(No. 3:08-cv-00035), 2008 WL 2433172. 
 16. See George D. Brown, “Counter-Counter-Terrorism via Lawsuit”—The Bivens Impasse, 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 841, 858–66 (2009) (discussing at length Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1970)).  
 17. See infra Part III.C.1.  
 18. See Note, Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1163 
(2009). 
 19. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1945–47 (2009) (discussing the collateral order 
doctrine). 
 20. Id. at 1949. 
 21. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 306 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 22. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
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“[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every 
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an 
injury.”23 That right, however, is far from absolute, even in a public law 
system based on Marbury. 
This Article considers the question of why such suits are so difficult to 
bring. One possibility is that the legal system reflects, implicitly, the view 
that tort suits are an imperfect vehicle for evaluating and formulating 
public policy, particularly binding constitutional limits. For example, an 
individual suit may consider only a tiny slice of a broader systemic 
problem. I do not believe, however, that such objections are a sufficient 
explanation for the difficulties that reverse war on terror suits encounter. 
Constitutional adjudication is an integral part of our system, and at the 
state and local level, policies are affected, even made, through 
constitutional tort suits brought under § 1983.24 Theories of adjudication 
emphasize its legitimacy as a means of formulating public values.25 The 
common law has played an indispensable role in formulating and enacting 
policy in general. At the constitutional level, individual criminal actions, to 
take one example, have been the dominant mode of formulating limits on 
criminal procedure.26 
The major part of the answer lies elsewhere: problems raised by suits 
that are, in effect, challenges to the government’s anti-terrorism policies. 
What is the proper role of the courts in such challenges? They inevitably 
produce calls for judicial deference in matters of national security, calls 
which are often heeded.27 Boumediene v. Bush led to a sharp exchange 
within the Court over whether the decision represented judicial usurpation 
of power over national security policy.28 The Supreme Court’s apparent 
assertiveness in habeas corpus cases such as Boumediene may not carry 
over to other forms of suits attacking anti-terrorism policies. Certainly, the 
result in Iqbal suggests this conclusion,29 as does the more recent decision 
in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.30 Habeas actions may occupy a 
central place in the constitutional order that damages suits do not.31 Thus, 
there are practical and theoretical problems with the notion of the 
                                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 163. 
 24. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 332–37. 
 26. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656–57 (1961). Many of these decisions were 
collateral review actions via federal habeas corpus.  
 27. See, e.g., Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 28. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 849–50 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 29. Iqbal was the first post-September 11 Supreme Court decision in a damages suit. Its 
predecessors involved habeas corpus. The Court found, or suggested, several ways in which the 
plaintiff’s claim was deficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1952–54 (2009).  
 30. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). Holder was a pre-enforcement challenge to an anti-terrorism 
criminal statute. The Court specifically invoked deference and embraced the “preventive” approach 
to terrorism. See id. at 2728. 
 31. See Brown, supra note 16, at 895–900 (discussing the distinction between habeas corpus 
cases and damages suits). 
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constitutional tort action as the legal and political systems’ preferred means 
of achieving truth and reconciliation goals. Yet, it may be the most 
important one we have.  
Injunctions will rarely be available.32 Prosecutions on any large scale 
are unlikely.33 Other institutions are, of course, potentially available. The 
existing mix of inspectors general and congressional committees can lead 
to reports and hearings that help us learn about past practices and shape 
future ones.34 The more potent of the two—congressional hearings—can 
suffer from the same partisanship that weakened the initial proposal to 
create a truth and reconciliation commission. Perhaps that proposal should 
be definitively scrapped in favor of something like the 9/11 Commission 
with a broad and open mandate. Whether the political system is up to the 
task is an open question.35 For the moment, the legal system’s 
contribution—the civil suit, particularly the constitutional tort suit—is the 
major truth and reconciliation vehicle available.  
This Article first considers briefly, in Part II, the concept of a truth and 
reconciliation commission as advanced by Senator Patrick Leahy. As 
argued above, there are basic flaws in his approach.  The analysis 
concludes that an essentially retributive commission will almost certainly 
not be formed. Part III begins by examining the concept of 
accountability—the core of any truth and reconciliation effort. It advances 
the proposition that reverse war on terror suits are serving, by default, as 
                                                                                                                     
 32. See, e.g., Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) 
(finding plaintiffs lacked standing to bring pre-enforcement challenge to amendment of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act). Most potential plaintiffs will lack standing either because they 
cannot show that a wrong happened to them at all or because they cannot show one will happen 
again. Moreover, the action for an injunction can put a court in the position of exercising a form of 
ongoing control over a coordinate branch in the area of national security. 
 33. See Daniel L. Pines, Are Even Torturers Immune from Suit? How Attorney General 
Opinions Shield Government Employees from Civil Litigation and Criminal Prosecution, 43 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 93, 94 (2008) (“[A] government employee is effectively immune from both civil 
claims and criminal prosecution for actions undertaken in reliance upon an Attorney General 
opinion.”). Prosecutions would be extremely controversial. They also have a hit-or-miss quality.  
Many possible defendants will escape prosecution because they relied in good faith on legal advice, 
evidence is unavailable, or the statute of limitations has run. See Press Release, Matthew Miller, 
Dir., Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Statement on the Investigation 
into the Destruction of Videotapes by CIA Personnel (Nov. 9, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/November/10-ag-1267.html (noting, “In January 2008, 
Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Assistant United States Attorney John Durham to 
investigate the destruction by CIA personnel of videotapes of detainee interrogations. Since that 
time, a team of prosecutors and FBI agents led by Mr. Durham has conducted an exhaustive 
investigation into the matter.  As a result of that investigation, Mr. Durham has concluded that he 
will not pursue criminal charges for the destruction of the interrogation videotapes.”).  
 34. See generally Kathleen Clark, The Architecture of Accountability: A Case Study of the 
Warrantless Surveillance Program, 2010 BYU L. REV. 357 (discussing accountability mechanisms, 
primarily in the executive branch). 
 35. See THE NAT’L COMM’N ON THE TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT (2004). 
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the society’s principal accountability vehicle. For example, they perform 
accountability functions—such as revealing how anti-terrorism efforts 
were conducted and forcing the government to present legal justifications 
for that conduct. I examine the extensive limits on the ability of these suits 
to perform that role as well as the possibility that those limits may be 
relaxed. 
Part IV asks why the legal system imposes such severe constraints. I 
consider two explanations. First, the limits flow from underlying concerns 
about the ability of the tort suit to serve broad goals of examination and 
evaluation of governmental policy, particularly when the imposition of 
constitutional restrictions is at stake. This is, at best, a partial explanation. I 
offer a complementary one: the general limits on the constitutional tort suit 
apply with particular force in the context of the war on terror. Concerns of 
judicial deference to the political branches are at their highest when 
national security is at issue. These concerns limit the courts’ normal ability 
to examine individual assertions of rights, let alone to function as bodies of 
national inquiry. 
The Article concludes that reverse war on terror suits are, at best, a 
default approach. There is a serious question whether they should, or 
should be expected to, play the role of America’s primary truth and 
reconciliation vehicle.   
II.  THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION THAT WASN’T 
The idea of a truth and reconciliation commission to examine the Bush 
administration’s anti-terrorism efforts has had a somewhat checkered 
history. The concept of a commission appears to have been formally 
launched by Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) in a speech at Georgetown 
University on February 9, 2009.36 He called for “a reconciliation process 
and truth commission,” whose “straightforward mission would be to find 
the truth.”37 The truth about what was not clear. Senator Leahy invoked 
both anti-terrorism efforts—“warrantless wiretapping [and] torture”—and 
broader issues such as “politicized hiring at the Department of Justice.”38 
Although Representative John Conyers (D-MI) filed legislation in the 
House “[t]o establish a national commission on presidential war powers 
and civil liberties,”39 the focus has been on Senator Leahy’s efforts. Rather 
than file a bill, Senator Leahy apparently hoped to drum up public and 
legislative support for the idea before proceeding with it. His initial efforts 
fell flat. After a March hearing that was something of a farce, the 
Washington Post reported that “[t]hings aren’t looking so good for the 
                                                                                                                     
 36. Leahy, supra note 4. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id.  
 39. Getting to the Truth Through a Nonpartisan Commission of Inquiry: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 1–2 (2009) (statement of Sen. Patrick J. Leahy) 
[hereinafter Truth Hearing]. 
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Truth Commission.”40 At one point, Senator Leahy’s strategy seemed 
reduced to circulating an online petition via YouTube.41 
Whether this uncertain trumpet is a partisan one might initially seem 
open to debate. After all, Senator Leahy evoked a nonpartisan commission 
that would seek “a mutual understanding of what went wrong and . . . learn 
from it,”42 and insisted that his goal is not “vengeance, [but] a fair-minded 
pursuit of what actually happened.”43 But he has had a hard time cloaking 
his real goal: exposing the fundamentally evil nature of the Bush 
administration through “accountability for what has been a dangerous and 
disastrous diversion from American law and values.”44 Blogging in the 
Huffington Post, the Senator minced no words: “We have just emerged 
from a time when White House officials often acted as if they were above 
the law. That was wrong and must be fully exposed so it never happens 
again.”45 The post is replete with references to Bush administration 
“abuses” and “misdeeds.”46 The Bush administration represents “eight 
corrosive years,” a “dark chapter in American history . . . .”47 The 
commission’s role would be to provide an “understanding of the failures of 
the recent past, so we do not repeat them in the future.”48  
As of this writing, the proposal seems dead in the water. There are three 
principal reasons. The first is the fundamental ambivalence between the 
inquiry model and the retributive model. The movement for the 
commission had a strong tilt toward the latter, which made it impossible to 
view the proposal as one for an objective inquiry that could garner support 
from all sides of the political spectrum. Even leaders of Senator Leahy’s 
own party were not interested in a witch hunt. There is a second reason 
why the proposal has lost whatever luster it may have had. Many of the 
policies that the commission would investigate are still in place. As 
Professor Jack Goldsmith wrote in The New Republic four months after 
President Obama’s inauguration, “[t]he new administration has copied 
most of the Bush program, has expanded some of it, and has narrowed only 
a bit.”49 Each month brings new revelations of continuity on matters 
                                                                                                                     
 40. Dana Milbank, Facing the Cold, Hard Truth, WASH. POST, Mar. 5, 2009, at A3. “Chief 
Pursuer of Truth Patrick Leahy cut a lonely figure yesterday as he tried to persuade the Senate 
Judiciary Committee to endorse his plan for . . . a commission to probe the Bush administration’s 
treatment of suspected terrorists.” Id. 
 41. See, e.g., Bush Truth Commission, http://www.bushtruthcommission.com (last visited 
Oct. 23, 2010). 
 42. Truth Hearing, supra note 39.  
 43. Leahy, supra note 4. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Patrick Leahy, A Truth Commission to Investigate Bush-Cheney Administration Abuses, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 12, 2009, 2:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sen-patrick-leahy/a-
truth-commission-to-inv_b_166461.html. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Jack Goldsmith, The Cheney Fallacy, NEW REPUBLIC (May 18, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
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ranging from “extraordinary rendition” to the executive power to detain.50 
This continuity is striking, even given the possibility that later Bush 
administration policies represented a retreat from the initial hard line. A 
third reason why the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission did not 
take hold in the United States is that the South African model rested on 
radically different preconditions from inquiry into the Bush 
administration’s anti-terrorism policies.51 In sum, Senator Leahy’s proposal 
is unlikely to go anywhere. 
III.  CIVIL LIABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY—THE PROS AND CONS 
A.  Liability as an Accountability Mechanism 
1.  The Concept of Accountability 
Discussions of examining Bush-era policies, whether through a 
commission or some other vehicle, inevitably involve calls for 
“accountability.”52 Although the term is widely used, it is not easily 
defined. One analyst refers to it as “elusive and controversial, with 
theoretical debates under way almost constantly.”53 Nonetheless, there are 
common themes to most discussions. As Dean Martha Minow puts it, 
“[a]ccountability . . . means being answerable to authority that can mandate 
desirable conduct and sanction conduct that breaches identified 
obligations.”54 Professor Robert Gregory offers the following helpful 
elaboration:  
Because accountability concerns are most commonly apparent 
when public power and authority have been abused or 
misused the term tends to have negative connotations. It is 
more likely to be used in public discourse when consequences 
flow from actions or inactions that are generally considered to 
be deleterious to the polity as a whole or to particular groups 
or individuals within it. . . . [P]eople frequently express 
concerns over accountability when they believe there has been 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/the-cheney-fallacy. 
 50. E.g., Editorial, Obama’s Kangaroo Courts, BOS. GLOBE, May 20, 2009, at A12 
(criticizing continued use of military tribunals). 
 51. Balkin, supra note 7. 
 52. E.g., Editorial, Impunity or Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2009, at A40; Editorial, 
Rendition, Torture and Accountability, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2007, at A22. 
 53. Paul G. Thomas, Accountability: Introduction, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
549, 549 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2003). For a helpful application of accountability 
concepts to a particular situation, see Ryan M. Scoville, Note, Toward an Accountability-Based 
Definition of “Mercenary,” 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 541, 562–81 (2006). 
 54. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1260 (2003). 
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none or too little of ‘it’. What is usually meant is that certain 
persons or organizations are illegitimately evading at least one 
of three things, if not all three: their need to explain events 
and circumstances; their own complicity in them; or blame 
and sanction for that complicity. Thus, accountability is 
identified with the demand that when things go wrong, ‘heads 
should roll’.55 
What does the concept mean in practice? In an important article, 
Professor Kathleen Clark develops a “process of accountability [with] four 
distinct stages.”56 The first stage is “informing,” in which “the accountor 
provides information relating to its conduct.”57 “The second stage is 
justification, where the accountor attempts to provide a justification for its 
conduct.58 The third stage is [an] evaluation, in which” that justification is 
examined and judged.59 “[T]he final stage is rectification,” a process that 
can lead to “a penalty or [other] remedy” if the justification is inadequate.60 
Rectification might take the form of “incapacitation” for future office 
holding, “deterrence” through punishment, “compensation” to those 
harmed, and “symbolic expression” authoritatively declaring the 
malfeasance and why it was wrong.61 Not all accountability mechanisms 
can lead to all four stages.62 Although I find Professor Clark’s analysis 
extremely helpful, it may be desirable to separate the fourth stage into three 
sub-components: compensation, deterrence (whether of the offending 
official or future ones), and general guidance.63  
2.  Civil Suits as Accountability Mechanisms 
The civil suit can lead to all of the stages. Indeed, there is mounting 
evidence that the suits generated by the war on terror are intended to, and 
might, serve as accountability mechanisms. A number of high profile suits 
have been filed, naming as defendants present and former officials at all 
levels, including the (former) Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, a 
                                                                                                                     
 55. Robert Gregory, Accountability in Modern Government, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 557, 558 (B. Guy Peters & Jon Pierre eds., 2003); see also Robert M. Chesney, 
National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1417–18 (2009) (discussing the 
importance of accountability to third parties on “decisionmakers who are aware that their judgments 
will be reviewed by an outsider”). 
 56. Clark, supra note 34, at 361. 
 57. Id. (formatting removed). 
 58. Id. at 362 (formatting removed). 
 59. Id. (formatting removed). 
 60. Id. (formatting removed). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. For Professor Clark, this is a broad category that can include “symbolic expression” as 
well as authoritative judgment as to legality. Id. 
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former top Justice Department official, and senior military officials.64 
Grievances include unconstitutional detention,65 unconstitutional 
conditions of confinement, “extraordinary rendition” leading to torture,66 
and legal advice that set in motion unconstitutional conduct. 67 Plaintiffs 
certainly assert constitutional torts leading to serious injuries, but 
compensation may not always be the “stage” of accountability that most 
concerns them. Jose Padilla sued John Yoo for $1 in damages based on the 
constitutional injuries allegedly caused by Yoo’s legal advice.68 Canadian 
citizen Maher Arar has already received over $10 million from the 
Canadian government for its part in his extraordinary rendition.69  
Lawyers close to the suits see them as a chance to force Bush 
administration practices into the open. As the Associated Press reported: 
“Critics of George W. Bush’s administration see the recent actions of the 
courts as a chance to wring a measure of accountability from the Bush 
White House — at a time when Obama expresses reluctance to look 
backward and Congress has shown little appetite for investigating the 
past.”70 Academic observers of the lawsuits see them the same way. 
Professor David Zaring has examined “[t]he high-profile policy-directed 
tort suit.”71 In his view, “[t]hese suits are more symbolic than likely to 
succeed, in that they rely not on the verdict, but on the ability to make a 
claim against a policy-maker.”72 “[L]itigants may not expect the courts to 
award them damages as much as they hope to remind the public that senior 
government officials have blessed an extraordinary rendition program, 
written opinions on tough interrogation techniques, or outed a covert 
agent.”73 Professor Peter Margulies views them as a form of “crossover 
advocacy.”74  
All of these observers see the reverse war on terror lawsuits as 
accountability mechanisms. Application of Professor Clark’s concept of 
stages of accountability helps prove the point. “Informing” certainly 
                                                                                                                     
 64. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010). 
 65. Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 965 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 
(U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98). 
 66. Arar, 585 F.3d at 563. 
 67. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1014–15 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 68. First Amended Complaint at 19–21, Padilla, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (No. 
3:08–cv–00035), 2008 WL 2433172. 
 69. See Editorial, A National Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2009, at A30 (indicating the 
amount of Canada’s offered settlement with Arar); Editorial, The Unfinished Case of Maher Arar, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2009, at A26 (discussing the Canadian government’s treatment of Arar). 
 70. Mark Sherman, Ex-Bush Officials Face Lawsuits over Their Actions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Sept. 29, 2009, 2009 WLNR 19286421 (emphasis added). 
 71. David Zaring, Personal Liability as Administrative Law, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 313, 
339 (2009). 
 72. Id. at 335. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Peter Margulies, The Detainees’ Dilemma: The Virtues and Vices of Advocacy Strategies 
in the War on Terror, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 347, 348–49 (2009). 
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occurs, even though in the initial phase of civil litigation it is not the 
accountor (the defendant) who provides the information. The plaintiff— 
who might be viewed as the account-holder—does so through his or her 
complaint. Of course, the accountor may be forced, through discovery, to 
amplify the available information. But, even at the complaint stage, one 
version of the accountor’s conduct becomes public. Professor Clark’s 
second stage of “justification” does not usually happen right away. The 
defendant will almost certainly assert non-merits defenses such as 
immunity, state secrets, or failure to satisfy cause of action requirements 
such as those required for a Bivens claim.75 Some of these defenses may 
involve a degree of justification—for example, an immunity defense 
contending that the asserted conduct did not violate a constitutional right, 
or, at least, a clearly established one.76 Of course, if the case proceeds, 
merits defenses will usually involve justification. A judgment on the merits 
will normally involve an evaluation. Even judicial resolution of non-merits 
defenses may involve a good deal of evaluation. As for the rectification 
stages, much depends on whether a judgment is reached and what it is. An 
ultimate judgment on the merits could lead to compensation, deterrence, 
and guidance. 
B.  An Initial Theoretical Foundation—Marbury 
The numerous obstacles they face call into serious question the 
practical value of civil suits as accountability mechanisms. But as a 
theoretical matter, any defense of civil suits as an accountability 
mechanism can rely on the ultimate trump card in American public law 
discourse: Marbury v. Madison.77 Perhaps the most important quote in that 
highly quotable case is Chief Justice Marshall’s declaration that: 
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the 
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, 
whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of 
government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the 
king himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and 
he never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.78  
Marbury’s grievance was against the government. He sued a government 
official to remedy it, and Marshall made it clear that such suits are at the 
core of the judicial role. The reference to English practice is telling: if 
absolute monarchs submit themselves to that duty, the officials of a 
republic should a fortiori do so. 
In a spirited defense of the Bivens constitutional tort action—the 
                                                                                                                     
 75. See Brown, supra note 16, at 883–86 (discussing problem of “special factors” exception 
to Bivens). 
 76. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, supra note 18, at 1163. 
 77. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 78. Id. at 163. 
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archetype of the reverse war on terror suit—Professor Susan Bandes 
invokes the Marbury principle as follows:  
Conceptually, though not chronologically, Bivens is a short 
step from Marbury. To uphold the rights of individuals before 
the Court, the Court must prevent encroachment on those 
rights by the political branches. More than a century and a 
half after Marbury, Bivens ratified judicial enforcement of the 
limits on governmental excess. The use of the Constitution as 
a sword; the willingness to enforce limits, which is the 
animating principle behind Bivens, rests on the notion of 
positive checks on government espoused in Marbury. It is 
inconsistent with a version of the separation of powers 
doctrine which views the tripartite functions as sharply 
separated, and the judiciary as passive in the face of 
incursions by the political branches.79 
Professors Richard Fallon and Daniel Meltzer elaborate on the 
distinction between the Marbury principle of a remedy for every right and 
“[a]nother principle, whose focus is more structural, [that] demands a 
system of constitutional remedies adequate to keep government generally 
within the bounds of law.”80 Of course, an Article III-based system that 
requires a case or controversy (in particular, a plaintiff who has suffered 
harm) often blends what Fallon and Meltzer call “providing effective 
remediation to individual victims” with “ensuring governmental 
faithfulness to law.”81 Reverse war on terror suits—given the fact that they 
are tort actions—seek to further both goals. 
C.  Limits on the Reverse War on Terror Suit 
1.  The Cause of Action Problem 
Most civil suits by victims of the war on terror will be constitutional 
torts brought under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.82 Bivens permits plaintiffs who assert 
constitutional violations to proceed directly against the relevant federal 
officials despite the lack of a statutory authorization analogous to § 1983.83 
However, Bivens has been a controversial doctrine since its promulgation 
                                                                                                                     
 79. Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 
289, 311 (1995) (footnotes omitted). 
 80. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1778–79 (1991). 
 81. Id. at 1789. 
 82. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 
 83. See Brown, supra note 16, at 869–70 (discussing parallel nature of the two remedies). 
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in 197184 and has recently seemed to be in sharp decline, almost to the 
point of being “disfavored.”85 It is, to a substantial extent, an exercise in 
judicial policymaking,86 and policies can cut more than one way. From the 
beginning, the Court indicated that a Bivens action might not proceed if (1) 
a case presented “special factors counselling [sic] hesitation”;87 or (2) 
Congress had declared that constitutional plaintiffs seeking damages from 
a federal officer “may not recover money damages from the agents, but 
must instead be remitted to another remedy, equally effective in the view 
of Congress.”88 For the last two decades, the Court has been cutting back 
substantially on the availability of Bivens suits, and the “special factors” 
doctrine has played the major role in Bivens’ decline.89 Reverse war on 
terror suits bristle with such questions as judicial deference to the 
executive in matters of military affairs and national security. These are 
precisely the sorts of questions that seem to constitute “special factors 
counselling [sic] hesitation.” The point has not been lost on the lower 
courts, which have tended to dismiss war on terror Bivens actions on 
precisely this ground.90 As of this writing, the Supreme Court has not 
addressed the matter.91 A striking example of the attitude of, and divisions 
within, the lower federal courts can be found in the Second Circuit’s en 
banc opinion in Arar v. Ashcroft.92 Arar was a damages action against 
high-level federal officials based on injuries the plaintiff claimed to have 
                                                                                                                     
 84. See, e.g., Bandes, supra note 79, at 293–94 (discussing controversial nature of doctrine). 
 85. See In re Iraq & Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 94 (D.D.C. 2007). 
 86. See Bivens, 403 U.S. at 399, 403–04 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the 
policymaking nature of remedial decisions). 
 87. Id. at 396 (majority opinion). 
 88. Id. at 397. 
 89. In Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007), the Court examined the alternative remedies 
available but based its conclusion of no Bivens remedy primarily on special factors analysis.  Id. at 
549–62.  Alternative remedies played an important role in such early cases as Carlson v. Green, 446 
U.S. 14, 18–19 (1980), but the Court’s emphasis during the retrenchment period of the 1980s 
shifted to special factors and sometimes conflated the two exceptions by treating the existence of an 
alternate remedy as a special factor. Alternate remedy analysis resurfaced in the Court’s most recent 
denial of a Bivens action in Hui v. Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845, 1850 (2010). Hui involved a statute 
that provided that in damages actions against Public Health Service personnel, the Federal Tort 
Claims Act remedy against the United States is exclusive. A unanimous Court treated the case as 
governed by the plain language of the statute, which it read as providing immunity from individual 
suits. Plaintiff’s attempt to assert a Bivens claim was thus denied. The Court did not engage in 
analysis of the alternative remedy exception, stating that “[w]e express no opinion as to whether a 
Bivens remedy is otherwise available in these circumstances, as the question is not presented in this 
case.” Id. at 1852 n.6. The Court of Appeals had engaged in an extensive consideration of the issue. 
See Castaneda v. United States, 546 F.3d 682, 688–700 (9th Cir. 2008), rev’d sub nom. Hui v. 
Castaneda, 130 S. Ct. 1845 (2010). 
 90. E.g., In re Afg. Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d at 107. 
 91. The Court’s most recent action was the denial of certiorari in Arar v. Ashcroft, 130 S. Ct. 
3409 (2010), discussed infra text accompanying notes 93–102. 
 92. 585 F.3d 559, 563–82 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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suffered as a result of his “extraordinary rendition” to Syria.93 His claims, 
based primarily on a Bivens theory, were largely rejected by the district 
court94 and a circuit panel majority.95 By a 7-4 margin, the circuit court 
affirmed the rejection en banc,96 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.97 
Given the denial of certiorari, this decision stands as that of the highest 
ranking court to address these issues. The en banc decision is a remarkable 
discussion not only of Bivens and related issues but of the broader question 
of the role of the courts in the war on terror.  
The majority stated that “[a]lthough this action is cast in terms of a 
claim for money damages against the defendants in their individual 
capacities, it operates as a constitutional challenge to policies promulgated 
by the executive.”98 The theme of damage suits as, in effect, suits against 
the government to challenge policy is an important conceptual 
underpinning of the opinion. Its major ground, however, was the limited 
competence of courts in areas of “foreign policy and national security.”99 
The latter, more familiar, argument is a recurring theme in national security 
litigation.100 It is, of course, in some tension with Marbury and with the 
view of courts as vindicators of rights in all contexts.101 The majority 
recognized this view but sidestepped the issue by invoking the superior 
competence of Congress to decide such matters as the availability of 
judicial remedies for claims such as Arar’s.102 
 As for Bivens issues, Arar arose after a prolonged period of Supreme 
Court hostility toward the constitutional tort action. In 2007, the Court 
stated: 
[W]e have . . . []held that any freestanding damages remedy 
for a claimed constitutional violation has to represent a 
judgment about the best way to implement a constitutional 
guarantee; it is not an automatic entitlement no matter what 
other means there may be to vindicate a protected interest, and 
in most instances we have found a Bivens remedy 
unjustified.103 
The Court caused some confusion when it opposed extending Bivens to 
                                                                                                                     
 93. See id. at 565–67 (detailing allegations). 
 94. Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 287–88 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 95. Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 96. Arar, 585 F.3d at 582. 
 97. Arar v. Aschcroft, 130 S. Ct. 3409, 3409 (2010). 
 98. Arar, 585 F.3d at 574. 
 99. Id. at 575. 
 100. E.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 579, 585–86 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 101. E.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535 (majority opinion). 
 102. Arar, 585 F.3d at 580–81. 
 103. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007). 
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new “contexts.”104 The meaning of “context” was uncertain.105 The Arar 
majority defined context as a “potentially recurring scenario that has 
similar legal and factual components.”106 It viewed the context in Arar as 
extraordinary rendition; the existence of this new context triggered the 
“special factors” inquiry.107 The court was quick to find such factors. It 
again emphasized the presence of national security issues and lack of 
judicial competence to deal with them.108 Indeed, it viewed the exception 
as triggered whenever special factors were identified—thus rejecting a 
balancing approach109—and stated that the resultant exercise of judicial 
discretion was appropriate whenever hesitation was counseled, not 
required.110 
 Arar appears to be a negative decision in its attitude toward, and 
resolution of, the Bivens remedy. The majority certainly thought its result 
was consistent with both the results and reasoning of Supreme Court 
precedents since the 1980s denying the remedy. However, one 
commentator has contended that the en banc opinion included “one 
analytical move that could actually prove beneficial to plaintiffs.”111 The 
argument is that following the Second Circuit approach would require a 
court to find the existence of a new context before examining whether 
special factors (or an adequate alternate remedy) exist. Under this view, it 
might be sufficient for a plaintiff to show the existence of a Bivens 
precedent that granted protection to the interests or right asserted.112 Such a 
finding would mean that the plaintiff did not seek an extension of Bivens to 
a new context; thus, it would be unnecessary to reach the exceptions. Hope 
and creativity spring eternal, but this analysis—turning an anti-plaintiff 
decision into a pro-plaintiff one—seems highly vulnerable on at least two 
grounds. First, the meaning of context is still uncertain. Moreover, even if 
a Bivens remedy had been previously recognized in a particular context, the 
presence of war on terror factors might still counsel hesitation. The latter 
contention was the key to Arar.  
Indeed, after Arar, it is no easier than before to answer the question of 
what constitutes a special factor counseling hesitation in a war on terror 
Bivens case. The Second Circuit opinion apparently rejects a broad 
approach—such as viewing the entire war on terror as a new context that 
constitutes a special factor113—in favor of a narrower approach that 
                                                                                                                     
 104. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). 
 105. See Brown, supra note 16, at 855–62. 
 106. Arar, 585 F.3d at 572. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 574–76. 
 109. Id. at 573–74. 
 110. Id. at 574. 
 111. Recent Cases, Second Circuit Holds that Alleged Victim of Extraordinary Rendition Did 
Not State a Bivens Claim. — Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), 123 HARV. 
L. REV. 1787, 1790 (2010).  
 112. Id. at 1793. 
 113. See Brown, supra note 16, at 888 (discussing treating the war on terror in its entirety as a 
 
16
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/6
2011] ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 209 
 
identifies specific aspects of the war on terror—such as extraordinary 
rendition—as new contexts which may present special factors.114 However, 
it finds special factors—such as deference to the political branches—that 
can apply to any aspect of the war on terror. This seemingly context-
specific opinion appears to camouflage a general approach. 
Without Bivens, most reverse war on terror suits will not survive the 
pleading stage. The Bivens debate raises the question of whether the 
special factors exception should serve as a general, almost inflexible 
obstacle or whether a more differentiated response is desirable at the 
threshold stage. The district court’s initial opinion in Padilla v. Yoo115 
illustrates the latter possibility.116 Yoo had been a high-level Justice 
Department official in the Bush administration. Padilla’s principal claim 
was that Yoo’s legal advice had laid the groundwork for Padilla’s 
mistreatment.117 In denying a motion to dismiss, the district court utilized a 
fact-specific analysis to reject special factors arguments centered on 
national security. It emphasized that Padilla’s complaint did not involve 
battlefield issues or relations with foreign governments.118 It thus was able 
to distinguish the Arar lower court reasoning that was vindicated on appeal 
and en banc. 
The Arar dissenters sounded many of the usual themes, including the 
role of courts in protecting individual liberties even when intrusion into 
national security might occur.119 The New York Times took a strong 
editorial stance, characterizing the denial of certiorari as “disgraceful.”120 
Not surprisingly, the dissenters disagreed with the majority on the 
application of the Bivens doctrine, denying that the case represented a new 
context and treating special factors as a limited exception. The dissenters 
saw Bivens as a blunt instrument in reverse war on terror litigation—
“barring all . . . plaintiffs at the courtroom door without further inquiry.”121 
Interestingly, they suggested use of the state secrets privilege,122 discussed 
below,123 as a possible differentiating mechanism to allow further 
proceedings in those Bivens actions in which damages of intrusion on 
national security were minimal. This would be a surprising turn of events. 
The privilege—particularly its use by the Bush administration—has been 
reviled by those who want to see more reverse war on terror suits.124  
                                                                                                                     
special factor). 
 114. Arar, 585 F.3d at 572. 
 115. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 116. Id. at 1019–20. 
 117. See id. at 1014–17. 
 118. Id. at 1025. 
 119. Arar, 585 F.3d at 612 (Parker, J., dissenting). 
 120. Editorial, No Price to Pay for Torture, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2010, at A30. 
 121. Arar, 585 F.3d at 603 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 122. Id. at 605–11. 
 123. See infra text accompanying notes 283–302. 
 124. Editorial, Unraveling Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2009, at A30 (criticizing Bush 
administration use of privilege, and stressing importance of civil suits for examining misconduct 
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An alternative route for some of the claims that might be presented in a 
Bivens action is the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).125 Indeed, 
the potential use of RFRA in suits such as those discussed in this Article is 
emerging as a cutting edge issue in reverse war on terror litigation. RFRA 
is a complex statute with a complex history.126 The most pertinent part 
provides as follows: 
 
§ 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected 
(a) In general  
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of 
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) 
of this section.  
(b) Exception  
Government may substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application 
of the burden to the person—  
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental 
interest; and  
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that 
compelling governmental interest.  
(c) Judicial relief  
A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in 
violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim 
or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate 
relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim or 
defense under this section shall be governed by the general 
rules of standing under article III of the Constitution.127 
 
This statute has several advantages for potential plaintiffs. It overcomes 
the cause of action problem by providing one. Many persons with 
conditions of confinement claims will be able to plausibly allege that their 
confinement included denial of religious materials, interference with 
prayers, or other practices that “burden . . . exercise of religion.”128 They 
will certainly try to go beyond obvious burdens to broader issues of 
religious discrimination. Moreover, RFRA appears to represent an example 
of rights conferred by statute. It does not require that the person claiming 
                                                                                                                     
and giving remedy to victims). 
 125. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2006). 
 126. See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (discussing history and bases 
of act and striking down its application to state and local governments). 
 127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2006). 
 128. E.g., Rasul v. Myers (Rasul II), 563 F.3d 527, 535 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (asserting condition 
of confinement claims under the Constitution, international law, and RFRA), cert. denied, 130 S. 
Ct. 1013 (2009). 
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its protection assert a constitutional right.129 At the moment, it is unclear 
whether Boumediene’s extension of habeas corpus rights to Guantanamo 
applies to other constitutional rights.130 Nor is it clear whether 
Boumediene, whatever its principle, applies beyond Guantanamo.131 It may 
well be the case, however, that this uncertainty is irrelevant to a RFRA 
plaintiff asserting a statutory right. 
Reverse war on terror plaintiffs have begun to grasp the potential of 
RFRA and to use it in their suits. For example, Jose Padilla alleged that 
John Yoo’s legal advice and direct personal involvement in the 
formulation of anti-terrorism policies—as well as his direct involvement in 
aspects of Padilla’s detention—“proximately and foreseeably led to the 
abuses suffered by [him].”132 The claimed deprivations included the 
following: “denial of any mechanism to tell time in order to ascertain the 
time for prayer in keeping with the Muslim practice” and “denial of access 
to the Koran for most of his detention.”133  
As part of an extensive order largely denying Yoo’s motion to dismiss, 
the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that 
a RFRA claim based on these denials could proceed.134  The key issue was 
whether “RFRA allows for individual capacity suits for money damages 
against federal officers.”135 The court relied in part on other lower court 
holdings that it does.136 The court also found in RFRA a clear tracking of 
the language of § 1983.137 District court decisions such as Padilla v. Yoo 
might seem to give the green light to a potentially expansive use of RFRA 
in conditions of confinement cases. There is, however, a significant 
obstacle: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit’s 
two decisions in Rasul v. Myers,138 adopting a narrow definition of the 
word “person” in RFRA, one which excludes nonresident aliens.139 
 Rasul was a damages action brought by former Guantanamo detainees, 
based on the conditions of their confinement, against a range of officials. 
                                                                                                                     
 129. See Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 366–72 
(D.N.J. 2004) (discussing statutory and constitutional dimensions of RFRA). 
 130. See Rasul II, 563 F.3d at 529. 
 131. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that 
Boumediene applies beyond Guantanamo), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 132. Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 133. Id. at 1014. 
 134. Id. at 1038–39. 
 135. Id. at 1039. 
 136. Id. (citing Lepp v. Gonzales, No. C–05–0566 VRW, 2005 WL 1867723, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 2, 2005); Jama v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 343 F. Supp. 2d 338, 373 (D.N.J. 
2004)). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Rasul v. Myers (Rasul I), 512 F.3d 644 (D.C. Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 763 (2008), 
on remand, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 
 139. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 671–72; Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S.Ct. 1013 (2009). 
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Their causes of action were based on Bivens, the Alien Tort Statute,140 and 
RFRA. The court initially held that “Guantanamo detainees lack 
constitutional rights because they are aliens without property or presence in 
the United States.”141 The court based this view on Supreme Court 
precedent and its own recent denial of a detainee’s Suspension Clause 
claim in Boumediene v. Bush.142 This reasoning carried over to the holding 
that nonresident aliens were not “persons” as that term is used in RFRA.143 
The court viewed RFRA, as originally enacted, as protecting only 
“persons” with First Amendment rights.144 Since the amended version of 
the statute still used the term “person,” the court concluded that Congress 
still intended it to exclude those persons who could not assert 
constitutional rights.145 
The holding in Rasul is surprising. It ignores the normal, plain meaning 
of the term person.146 It also ignores the fact that the revised version of 
RFRA no longer defines the “exercise of religion” by reference to the First 
Amendment.147 The Supreme Court’s reversal of Boumediene148 cast 
further doubt on Rasul, one of the cases on which it was based. Indeed, 
shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court vacated Rasul and remanded it to the 
District of Columbia Circuit “for further consideration in light of 
Boumediene.”149 Undaunted, the circuit court reaffirmed its prior holding 
as to all claims, including RFRA.150  
The District of Columbia Circuit is, of course, correct in that the 
applicability of Boumediene to constitutional rights beyond habeas—
whether at Guantanamo or on a broader basis—is an open question. I have 
argued that in the Bivens context the Court’s receptivity to habeas claims 
may not extend to substantive claims.151 As for constitutional extra-
territoriality, the Boumediene majority was careful to leave standing and 
distinguish precedents such as Johnson v. Eisenstrager.152 RFRA claims 
are statutory, however. One could read Boumediene as reinforcing the 
                                                                                                                     
 140. 28 U.S.C. § 1350; see also infra text accompanying notes 166–84.  
 141. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 663.  
 142. 476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev’d, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).  
 143. RFRA states, in part, that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a) (2006). 
 144. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 668–72.  
 145. Id. 
 146. See id. at 673–76 (Brown, J., concurring).  
 147. But see id. at 675–76 (recognizing broadening of scope of rights but concluding that it did 
not broaden the range of individuals concerned).  
 148. Boumediene v.  Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 149. Rasul v. Myers, 129 S. Ct. 763, 763 (2008). 
 150. Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
Rasul’s treatment of claims under the Alien Tort Statute is discussed infra in text accompanying 
notes 166–86. 
 151. Brown, supra note 16, at 897–900. 
 152. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 726 (rejecting the reasoning of Johnson v. Eisenstrager, 339 
U.S. 763 (1950)). 
20
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/6
2011] ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 213 
 
Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Rasul v. Bush153 that statutory habeas 
corpus was available at Guantanamo.154 Taken together, the two cases 
emphasize the importance of the enforceability of rights at Guantanamo. In 
Rasul, a receptive lower court could have allowed the RFRA claim to 
proceed without reaching the difficult question of constitutional scope. 
However, in December 2009, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Rasul 
v. Myers,155 thus leaving intact, for now, the circuit court’s holding on all 
issues, including RFRA. This holding does not affect claims by U.S. 
citizens or claims arising within the United States.  
RFRA has its limits, even if the District of Columbia Circuit’s negative 
construction is not followed. Not all asserted victims of the war on terror 
will be able to assert a religious dimension to their claims. I will briefly 
consider two alternative sources of a cause of action—one narrow, one 
potentially broad. Plaintiffs asserting torture by the government will seek 
to invoke the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).156 A principal goal of 
that statute is to ensure that an official who “subjects an individual to 
torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual.”157 
Not only does the Act provide an express cause of action, but it also 
defines “torture” quite broadly.158 The statute is limited, however, to acts 
committed “under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any 
foreign nation.”159 In Arar,160 the Second Circuit panel, in affirming a 
district court ruling, held that this limitation precluded a TVPA action 
against American officials, even when the plaintiff alleged that they had 
worked closely with Syrian officials in an “extraordinary rendition.”161 The 
court issued what seems to be a per se ruling that the American officials 
would have to act under the “control or influence”162 of a foreign state, to 
the point that their power could be seen as “derived” from that state.163 The 
en banc majority agreed, stating that in order to state a claim under the 
TVPA, Arar would have had to allege that the defendant officials 
“possessed power under Syrian law.”164 The court rejected the dissent’s 
argument from § 1983 precedents dealing with the possibility that non-
state actors’ involvement with state officials turns the formers’ conduct 
into state action.165 The majority’s view—that federal officials act under 
                                                                                                                     
 153. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 154. Id. at 484. 
 155. 130 S. Ct. 1013, 1014 (2009) (mem.). 
 156. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1350 notes (2006)).  
 157. Id. § 2(a)(1). 
 158. See id. § 3(b)(1). 
 159. Id. § 2(a). 
 160. 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), aff’d on reh’g, 585 F. 3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 161. Arar, 532 F.3d at 176 (discussing problem of joint action).  
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Arar, 585 F.3d at 568.  
 165. Id. at 568 n.3. 
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color of federal law even when they cooperate closely with foreign 
officials—seems a more accurate description of the relevant legal 
relationships. Thus, it is unlikely that the TVPA will overcome cause of 
action problems in reverse war on terror suits. There is, however, a broader 
possibility for some plaintiffs.  
Non-citizen claimants can attempt to assert their non-constitutional 
claims through the seemingly broad vehicle of the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS),166 which provides that the “[t]he district courts shall have original 
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”167 This 
statute solves the cause of action problem, and its coverage of grievances 
governed by treaties and international law could get many plaintiffs past 
the pleading stage. Some of these complaints could also embrace 
constitutional claims. This may be the case notwithstanding the Supreme 
Court’s admonition in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain—the foundational ATS 
case—that “federal courts should not recognize [private] claims under 
federal common law for violations of any international law norm with less 
definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the 18th-
Century paradigms familiar when § 1350 was enacted.”168 
The (perhaps insurmountable) obstacle to any use of the ATS is the 
Westfall Act,169 which governs generally non-constitutional tort actions 
against federal employees or officials. The Act provides: 
Upon certification by the Attorney General that the defendant 
employee was acting within the scope of his office or 
employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim 
arose, any civil action or proceeding commenced upon such 
claim in a United States district court shall be deemed an 
action against the United States under the provisions of this 
title and all references thereto, and the United States shall be 
substituted as the party defendant.170 
This language triggers the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),171 which 
contains an exhaustion requirement.172 This requirement proved fatal to the 
ATS claims of the former detainees in Rasul brought against Defense 
Department and military officials. The District of Columbia Circuit 
affirmed dismissal of these claims because “[t]he record is devoid . . . of 
any suggestion that they complied with any of the procedures governing 
                                                                                                                     
 166. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 694 (2004). 
 169. Pub. L. No. 100-694, 102 Stat. 4563 (1988) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 831c-2 (2006); 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1 note, 2671, 2671 notes, 2674, 2679, 2679 notes (2006)). 
 170. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006). 
 171. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2006). 
 172. Id. § 2675(a).  
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the filing of an administrative claim with DoD or one of the military 
departments.”173 Even assuming exhaustion is satisfied, the FTCA contains 
a number of exceptions that can bar relief for reverse war on terror 
plaintiffs. These include, for example, activities that took place in a foreign 
country174 and those that involve exercise of a “discretionary” function.175  
The key point in the suit thus becomes the validity of the Attorney 
General’s scope of employment certification. Courts will entertain a 
challenge to a certification, although it is prima facie evidence of scope of 
employment.176 The plaintiff bears the burden of rebutting the certification. 
Rasul shows how onerous this burden can be. The plaintiffs argued that 
torture cannot be within the scope of employment.177 Relying on both 
precedent and the Restatement (Second) of Agency,178 the District of 
Columbia Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed the district court’s 
decision.179  
The court of appeals did not focus on the military, war on terror 
context, but it relied heavily on scope of employment cases primarily from 
the private sector. For example, a deliveryman acted within the scope of 
his employment “when he assaulted and raped a customer.”180 A 
laundromat employee acted “within [the] scope of his employment when 
he shot [a] customer during [a] dispute over removal of clothes from [a] 
washing machine.”181 These disputes—in which the employer was held 
liable—arose out of the conduct of the employer’s business. By analogy, 
“the detention and interrogation of suspected enemy combatants is a 
central part of the defendants’ duties as military officers charged with 
winning the war on terror.”182 The District of Columbia Circuit Court 
emphasized that the Restatement declares that “criminal conduct is not per 
se outside the scope of employment.”183 One can question this aspect of 
Rasul on at least two levels. The plaintiff’s principal claim was based on 
                                                                                                                     
 173. Rasul I, 512 F.3d 644, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 174. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2006). 
 175. Id. § 2680(a); see also, e.g., Richard Henry Seamon, U.S. Torture as a Tort, 37 RUTGERS 
L.J. 715, 742–50 (2006). Professor Richard Henry Seamon concludes that “precedent strongly 
suggests that the formulation of the policies that have led to the torture of suspected terrorists 
involves the kind of discretion that the discretionary function clause protects. The policies are 
‘susceptible to’ considerations of public safety, foreign intelligence needs, military strategy, and 
foreign relations.” Id. at 749.  
 176. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 655 (citing Council on Am. Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d 
659, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). 
 177. Id. at 656. 
 178. E.g., id. at 655–56 (applying Restatement factors).  
 179. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 656–61; Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 533 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 
130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).  
 180. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 657; see Lyon v. Carey, 533 F.2d 649, 655 (D.C. Cir. 1976).  
 181. Rasul I, 512 F.3d at 657–58 (citing Johnson v. Weinberg, 434 A.2d 404, 409 (D.C. 
1981)).  
 182. Id. at 658.  
 183. Id. at 659. 
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torture. Torture is a violation of fundamental values recognized in statutes, 
treaties, and, by implication, the Constitution.184 As Professor David Cole 
puts it, “[t]orture is different. International and U.S. law provide that 
torture is never justifiable, under any circumstances, for any reason, in war 
or peace.”185 For example, a “necessity defense” cannot be interposed 
against a claim of torture.186 On a different level, one can question the use 
of cases in which the result was to impose liability on the employer as a 
means to let individual defendants escape liability and remit plaintiffs to 
the quagmire of the FTCA.  
Up to this point, cause of action analysis has focused on the role of the 
judiciary, both in creating and defining the constitutional tort action in the 
Bivens context and in interpreting the statutory causes of action created by 
RFRA, TVPA, and ATS. However, Congress’s role may become more 
important. It might, for example, create private causes of action with more 
specific connections to the war on terror than these three statutes. A section 
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides for civil liability if it 
has been violated.187 In an important ruling on the National Security 
Agency’s program on warrantless electronic surveillance, a federal district 
court awarded damages under this section, although it treated the statute as 
a waiver of sovereign immunity.188  Thus, damages were awarded against 
the government but not against individual officials.189 Congress might also 
act to restrict whatever causes of action are available. It has attempted to 
eliminate jurisdiction over complaints by “enemy combatants”190 and has 
provided defenses to claims arising out of interrogation practices.191 Given 
these steps, it seems unlikely that Congress will act further to ease the 
cause of action problems described above. As noted, these problems can 
prevent a potential plaintiff from even bringing a constitutional, or similar, 
tort action in the war on terror context. Professor Margulies observes that 
“[i]n decisions that appear most likely to be influential, courts have 
displayed categorical deference, precluding Bivens actions and encouraging 
officials’ unwise risk-seeking behavior.”192 Moreover, cause of action 
                                                                                                                     
 184. See Seamon, supra note 175, at 716 n.1 (citing domestic and international law, including 
the Detainee Treatment Act, which provides that, “‘No individual in the custody or under the 
physical control of the United States Government, regardless of nationality or physical location, 
shall be subject to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.’”).  
 185. THE TORTURE MEMOS 7 (David Cole ed., 2009). 
 186. See id. at 23–24 (discussing “necessity” and “self–defense” defenses).  
 187. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2006).  
 188. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 700 F. Supp.  2d 1182, 1193 (N.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 189. Id. at 1202–03. 
 190. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7, 120 Stat. 2600, 2635 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2441(e) (Supp. III 2009)). 
 191. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1004, 119 Stat. 2739, 2740 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000dd-1 (Supp. II 2008)). 
 192. Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security 
Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 221 (2010). 
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problems are only the first of many limits.193  
2.  Immunity 
The doctrine of immunity is controversial. If the defendant invokes it 
successfully, the suit is over. Critics have labeled recent immunity 
developments as a “twentieth century betrayal of founding principles.”194 
Yet, “it is widely believed that some degree of immunity for individual 
officers is imperative.”195 The tension between immunity and Marbury is 
particularly significant. For Professor Akhil Amar, it contradicts 
Marbury’s “central tenet” that “every right . . . must have a remedy.”196 
However, the Supreme Court majority in Nixon v. Fitzgerald,197—a 
decision granting the President absolute immunity—saw the issue in a 
different light: “[I]t is not true that our jurisprudence ordinarily supplies a 
remedy in civil damages for every legal wrong.”198 Besides immunity, the 
Court noted the importance of denials of implied rights actions and denials 
of Bivens remedies on special factors grounds.199 It also noted that 
“Marbury . . . lost his case in the Supreme Court.”200 
 The obvious question that the existence of immunity poses is what 
rationale is strong enough to blunt the thrust of Marbury. The Supreme 
Court’s consistent answer to this question has been the need to ensure zeal 
on the part of public officials when performance of their duties puts them 
in conflict with citizens.201 Here is how the Court in Nixon described a 
foundational 19th Century decision: 
Drawing upon principles of immunity developed in English 
cases at common law, the Court concluded that “[t]he 
interests of the people” required a grant of absolute immunity 
to public officers. In the absence of immunity, the Court 
reasoned, executive officials would hesitate to exercise their 
discretion in a way “injuriously affect[ing] the claims of 
particular individuals,” even when the public interest required 
bold and unhesitating action. Considerations of “public policy 
and convenience” therefore compelled a judicial recognition 
                                                                                                                     
 193. See Developments in the Law—Access to Courts, supra note 18, at 1163 (concluding that, 
“[D]etainees face daunting legal challenges to having their claims of wrongful detention, torture and 
abuse heard in federal court.”). 
 194. Akil Reid Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Commentary, Executive Privileges and 
Immunities: The Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 709 (1995).  
 195. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 526 (5th ed. 2007). 
 196. Amar & Katyal, supra note 194, at 707.  
 197. 457 U.S. 731 (1982). 
 198. Id. at 754 n.37. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. at 755 n.37. 
 201. E.g., id. at 753 n.32.  
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of immunity from suits arising from official acts.202 
Analytically, there are two forms of immunity: absolute and qualified. 
The former is rare, however. Even those officials who have it—e.g., 
legislators, prosecutors, and judges—are only immune when sued for 
functions that are part of the core of the office that creates the immunity in 
the first place. For example, judges are immune for acts performed in their 
judicial capacity.203 Society does not want them to be in fear of a suit by 
the losing party. They are not immune, however, for administrative or 
executive acts.204 
 Qualified, not absolute, immunity is the norm. Prior to 2009, the Court 
required a two-step inquiry: 
First, a court must decide whether the facts that a plaintiff has 
alleged (see Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), (c)) or shown (see 
Rules 50, 56) make out a violation of a constitutional right. 
Second, if the plaintiff has satisfied this first step, the court 
must decide whether the right at issue was “clearly 
established” at the time of defendant’s alleged misconduct.  
Qualified immunity is applicable unless the official’s conduct 
violated a clearly established constitutional right.205 
The Court modified this inquiry in Pearson v. Callahan,206 making the 
first step optional.207 It remains to be seen whether elimination of the first 
step will impede the articulation of constitutional rights.208 The important 
point is that the defendant’s immunity is defined by reference to his 
perception of the plaintiff’s rights and whether that perception was 
reasonable. Finally, immunity is often analyzed as a right the defendant 
possesses separate and distinct from the merits—a right not to be tried at 
all in certain cases.209 Denial of an immunity claim can be appealed at 
once, under the “collateral order” doctrine.210 
 Qualified immunity has played an important role in the reverse war on 
terror litigation. An important question has been the clarity with which the 
plaintiff’s asserted rights were established at the time of violation. 
                                                                                                                     
 202. Id. at 744–45 (quoting Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483, 498–99 (1896) (citations 
omitted)).  
 203. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 195, at 534–37.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–16 (2009) (citations omitted) (citing Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 200 (2001); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).  
 206. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). 
 207. Id. at 821. 
 208. See id. at 819 (discussing role of first step).  
 209. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525–26 (1985). 
 210. See, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 741–44 (1982) (discussing doctrine in 
context of absolute immunity).  
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Plaintiffs will often win this battle. In Iqbal v. Hasty,211 a classic conditions 
of confinement case, the Second Circuit remarked:  
[T]he exigent circumstances of the post-9/11 context do not 
diminish the Plaintiff’s right not to be needlessly harassed and 
mistreated in the confines of a prison cell by repeated strip 
and body-cavity searches. This and other rights, such as the 
right to be free from use of excessive force and not to be 
subjected to ethnic or religious discrimination, were all 
clearly established prior to 9/11 . . . .212  
There may be rights, viewed as more at the margin, that were not 
clearly established at the relevant time.213 The Pearson rule, permitting 
omission of the inquiry as to whether a right exists at all, may slow 
clarification of the existence of rights. For noncitizens complaining of 
conduct outside the United States, the major immunity question will be 
whether they possessed any constitutional rights and whether defendants 
could have reasonably foreseen that they did.   
If we assume that most of the suits under discussion here will be 
brought against Bush-era officials for actions outside the United States, a 
number of claims will be barred by qualified immunity. Of course, the 
Boumediene rule might be extended to rights beyond habeas corpus and the 
areas beyond Guantanamo.214 These developments would raise, in the 
immunity context, the question of whether defendants should have 
foreseen the rights despite the District of Columbia Circuit’s view in Rasul 
that they could not.215 The Ninth Circuit has required a high degree of 
foresight on the defendant official’s part, even though there were no 
decisions squarely on point that would invalidate his conduct.216 In Al-Kidd 
v. Ashcroft,217 the court noted the presence of dicta, decisions on analogous 
issues, and the point that “the history and purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment were known well before 2003.”218 Still, an important goal of 
qualified immunity is that officials—whose zeal the system wants to 
encourage—should not have to guess about the existence of rights. Rasul 
will probably be followed by other courts, permitting numerous assertions 
of qualified immunity in suits by aliens based on conduct outside the 
                                                                                                                     
 211. 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).  
 212. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 159–60.  
 213. Id. at 167–68 (procedural due process rights prior to prison administrative segregation).  
 214. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 208–09 (D.D.C. 2009) (extending 
Boumediene rule to Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 215. Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 530 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“No reasonable government official would 
have been on notice that plaintiffs had any Fifth Amendment or Eighth Amendment rights.”), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009). 
 216. See Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 970 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 
3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 970–71.  
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United States. In the domestic war on terror context, Rasul’s utility to 
defendant officials is less clear. John Yoo has said that it is of little 
value.219 Thus, qualified immunity may be less of a problem for some 
plaintiffs than cause of action issues.  
Of course, the war on terror could cause the domestic rules to change. 
This is certainly a context in which we want officials to act with zeal. 
Front-line officers may have to make split-second decisions that could 
affect thousands of lives. Higher-level officials may have to formulate 
policies that run up against constitutional protections in order to adequately 
investigate the terror threat.220 Thus, officials at all levels need freedom to 
act. Even if current suits are only against Bush administration officials, the 
law must seek to develop immunity doctrines that protect future 
administrations as well. One of the rationales for immunity is the 
importance of attracting individuals to government service without their 
having to fear a constant barrage of suits for doing their duty.221 Moreover, 
given the war on terror, federal officials may have a special need for 
immunity that their state and local counterparts lack. Immunity is a judge-
made doctrine, heavily driven by concerns of public policy.222 The big 
question is whether the Court might formulate special rules for federal 
officials engaged in the war on terror.  
Any such effort to change the rules would be a step toward bifurcating 
federal level immunity from that enjoyed by state and local officials. As 
such, it would run counter to one of the fundamental tenets of immunity 
law: that it is the same for federal and state officials. In Butz v. 
Economou,223 the Supreme Court declared categorically that “we deem it 
untenable to draw a distinction for purposes of immunity law between suits 
brought against state officials under § 1983 and suits brought directly 
under the Constitution against federal officials.”224 The Court noted that 
prior precedent had treated the two questions as interchangeable and 
concluded that the immunity inquiry in both contexts should be guided by 
the same policy considerations.225 In an excellent recent article on Bivens, 
Professor James Pfander and his co-author David Baltmanis reinforce the 
Butz parallelism in the following terms: persons who seek recourse from 
the courts for violations of their rights by public officials should not 
encounter different doctrines of immunity depending on the happenstance 
of the level of government for which the official works.226 
                                                                                                                     
 219. John Yoo, Terrorist Tort Travesty, WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 2008, at A13. 
 220. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009) (emphasizing importance of 
freeing from litigation officials who are responding to a national security emergency). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See, e.g, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 744–45 (1982). 
 223. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 224. Id. at 504. 
 225. Id. at 503–04. 
 226. James E. Pfander & David Baltmanis, Rethinking Bivens: Legitimacy and Constitutional 
Adjudication, 98 GEO. L.J. 117, 124–25 (2009). 
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Things may not be so clear, however. Butz was a 5–4 decision.227 Four 
Justices sharply disagreed with the majority and advocated “differing 
standards of immunity.”228 For Justice William Rehnquist, “even a 
moment’s reflection on the nature of the Bivens-type action and the 
purposes of § 1983, as made abundantly clear in this Court’s prior cases, 
supplies a compelling reason for distinguishing between the two different 
situations.”229 He emphasized Congress’s waiver of sovereign immunity in 
the FTCA and argued that the federal government has greater supervisory 
power over its own officials than it does over state officials.230 On a 
conceptual level, different treatment of the immunity question might be 
warranted by the fact that § 1983 is a statutory cause of action while 
Bivens—the principal source of suits in which federal immunity issues will 
arise—is entirely judge-made. Certainly, the Court has looked to the history 
and purpose of § 1983 to resolve issues of state and local immunity.231 And 
with respect to the availability of Bivens actions, it has developed a 
significant doctrine of limitation—special factors counseling hesitation—
not present in the § 1983 context. It is true, despite these arguments, that 
any move away from parallelism would be a big step. But the full effects of 
the war on terror on the judicial role and judicial doctrines remain to be 
seen. 
If courts are willing to take this step, what might immunity doctrine 
look like? One can find the suggestion that absolute immunity is 
appropriate in the national security context.232 However, Mitchell v. 
Forsyth233 appears to have put an end to this possibility. Although the 
Mitchell Court was split in numerous ways, there seems little possibility of 
a reconsideration of the prevailing opinion’s view that “[t]he danger that 
high federal officials will disregard constitutional rights in their zeal to 
protect the national security is sufficiently real to counsel against affording 
such officials an absolute immunity.”234 The question will become how to 
apply the current framework for qualified immunity to the special 
circumstances of the war on terror. The current focus is on the defendant’s 
knowledge of the plaintiff’s rights. In his book Not a Suicide Pact,235 Judge 
Richard Posner considers the question of “how far civil liberties based on 
the Constitution should be permitted to vary with the threat level.”236 
                                                                                                                     
 227. Justice Byron White authored the majority opinion. Butz, 438 U.S. at 480.  
 228. Id. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 524–25. 
 231. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). But see Butz, 438 U.S. at 501–02 
(majority opinion) (questioning emphasis on legislative creation of cause of action in determining 
immunity).  
 232. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 538, 540–42 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).  
 233. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). 
 234. Id. at 523 (majority opinion). 
 235. RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL 
EMERGENCY (2006).  
 236. Id. at 7. 
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Posner advocates a balancing approach to determine the scope of 
constitutional rights in emergency circumstances.237 Building on Posner, a 
defendant official could argue that the emergency circumstances of the war 
on terror rendered the plaintiff’s rights less “clearly established” than they 
would have been in normal times.  
An argument along these lines was advanced in the first Iqbal appeal to 
the Second Circuit.238 On the issue of qualified immunity, some defendants 
argued that “the post-9/11 context requires a different outcome.”239 They 
contended that “even if the law was clearly established as to the existence 
of a right claimed to have been violated, it was not clearly established in 
the extraordinary circumstances of the 9/11 attack and its aftermath.”240 As 
noted, the court rejected the argument both on the ground that the rights 
were clearly established and on the ground that they “do not vary with the 
surrounding circumstances.”241 Later in the Article, I will address the issue 
of whether arguments of this sort can be put forward as substantive 
defenses.242 I raise the point here both to underscore how closely entangled 
immunity and merits issues can become and to note how defendants may 
piggyback merits issues onto immunity denial appeals. John Yoo may be 
right, for now, on the limited value of immunity. Still, defendants will win 
some cases.243 Collateral appeals of immunity denials—coupled with 
possible piggybacking of other issues244—could lead to long delays. And, 
of course, given the uncertain reach of Boumediene, it seems almost certain 
that Bush administration officials can claim immunity with respect to 
claims by aliens based on actions arising outside the United States. In sum, 
immunity is not a toothless tiger. It represents one more limit to the 
availability of reverse war on terror suits.   
3.  The Shadow of Iqbal—Pleading, Supervisory Liability, and 
Immunity Reinforced 
Its 2009 decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal245 is widely regarded as one of the 
Supreme Court’s most important rulings on pleading requirements under 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.246 Its importance extends well 
                                                                                                                     
 237. Id. at 9, 31, 35, 41.  
 238. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 
1937 (2009). 
 239. Hasty, 490 F.3d at 159. 
 240. Id. 
 241. Id. at 159–60. 
 242. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 243. E.g., Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527, 532–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 
(2009). 
 244. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 548–49 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the Court’s “toothless” standard regarding issues that can be raised on interlocutory 
appeals of immunity denials).  
 245. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 246. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Case About 9/11 Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits, 
 
30
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/6
2011] ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 223 
 
beyond pleading, particularly for the civil suits discussed in this Article. 
Iqbal was a reverse war on terror Bivens action. The plaintiff claimed that 
after the September 11 attacks, federal officials adopted a policy of highly 
restrictive detention of Arab Muslim men. Having been detained pursuant 
to this policy, the plaintiff further alleged mistreatment of various sorts 
including physical harm and interference with religious practices.247 He 
sued both the high-level officials responsible for this policy and the lower-
level officials who carried it out.248 He asserted constitutional claims under 
Bivens and statutory claims of the sort discussed above,249 most of which 
were dismissed.250 The case came before the Second Circuit on appeal 
from a denial of a claim for qualified immunity. The appeals court cast the 
immunity claim in the following terms: 
[The] arguments with respect to qualified immunity fall into 
several broad categories: (1) the Plaintiff's allegations do not 
allege the violation of a clearly established right, (2) do not 
allege sufficient personal involvement of the Defendants in 
the challenged actions, (3) are too conclusory to overcome a 
qualified immunity defense, and (4) the Defendants’ actions 
were objectively reasonable. Permeating the Defendants’ 
assertion of a qualified immunity defense is the contention 
that, however the defense might be adjudicated in normal 
circumstances, the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack 
created a context in which the defense must be assessed 
differently and, from their standpoint, favorably.251 
It denied virtually all of the immunity claims.252 At issue before the 
Supreme Court were the immunity claims of two high ranking officials—
former Attorney General John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert 
Mueller.253  
The Court reversed the denials.254 Central to its resolution of the issue 
was its understanding of the concept of supervisory liability. Plaintiff did 
not allege that Ashcroft and Mueller confiscated his Koran. But he did 
allege that they formulated the policies that permitted the abuses, knew of 
                                                                                                                     
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009, at A10 (calling Iqbal “[t]he most consequential decision of the Supreme 
Court’s last term”).  
 247. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1943–44 (outlining allegations). 
 248. The Supreme Court decision dealt only with two high-level officials: the Attorney 
General and the Director of the FBI. Id. at 1942. 
 249. See supra Part III.C.1.  
 250. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 150–01 (2d Cir. 2007) (summarizing the litigation in the 
district court), rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 251. Id. at 151. 
 252. Id. at 168–77.  
 253. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1942 (2009). 
 254. Id. at 1943. The opinion focuses more on pleading and related issues than on the merits of 
each individual claim. See id. at 1942–43. 
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and condoned the policies, and acted because of the race, religion, and/or 
national origin of the plaintiff and his fellow detainees.255 The Court 
treated the case generally as raising a claim of unconstitutional 
discrimination.256 It saw the problem as essentially one of supervisory 
liability: did the plaintiff adequately claim discrimination by these officials, 
or was he attempting to hold them liable for the acts of subordinates?257 If 
the latter, any such claim would run into the well-established doctrine that 
“[g]overnment officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional 
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”258  
The majority held that the plaintiff had failed to meet the requirement 
that he “plead that each [g]overnment-official defendant, through the 
official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”259 What is 
unclear is whether this is a holding about supervisory liability in the 
discrimination context or in every context. The majority opinion can be 
read both ways. At times, it focuses on the apparent contention that a 
supervisor’s knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose 
amounts to the supervisor’s violating the Constitution.260 But the majority 
is also more categorical: “In a . . . Bivens action—where masters do not 
answer for the torts of their servants—the term ‘supervisory liability’ is a 
misnomer.”261 
The last sentence appears to remove supervisory liability from Bivens 
actions. The dissent read the opinion this way. According to Justice David 
Souter, “the majority is not narrowing the scope of supervisory liability; it 
is eliminating Bivens supervisory liability entirely.”262 If accurate, this 
broad reading may pose serious problems for plaintiffs suing policy makers 
over their individual grievances and for the utility of the civil suit as an 
accountability mechanism in examining policies. Plaintiffs would 
presumably have to show not just that a policy led to unconstitutional 
results, but also that such results were one of its goals. It may be that, 
outside the discrimination context, plaintiffs challenging policies such as 
extraordinary rendition can make this showing. However, defendants will 
certainly try to separate the consequences of a policy from the policy itself. 
Much will depend on the attitude of lower courts. In Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft,263 
decided after Iqbal, the Ninth Circuit offered the following analysis: 
                                                                                                                     
 255. Id. at 1954–55 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 256. Id. at 1947 (majority opinion). 
 257. Id. at 1949. 
 258. Id. at 1948.  
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 1950–52. The Court stated that “[t]he factors necessary to establish a Bivens 
violation will vary with the constitutional provision at issue.” Id. at 1948.  
 261. Id. at 1949. 
 262. Id. at 1957 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 263. 580 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 
10-98). 
32
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/6
2011] ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 225 
 
Al-Kidd’s complaint does not allege that Ashcroft was 
directly involved in the decision to detain al-Kidd. But 
“direct, personal participation is not necessary to establish 
liability for a constitutional violation.” Supervisors can be 
held liable for the actions of their subordinates (1) for setting 
in motion a series of acts by others, or knowingly refusing to 
terminate a series of acts by others, which they knew or 
reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict 
constitutional injury; (2) for culpable action or inaction in 
training, supervision, or control of subordinates; (3) for 
acquiescence in the constitutional deprivation by 
subordinates; or (4) for conduct that shows a “reckless or 
callous indifference to the rights of others.”264 
Not all plaintiffs may be so fortunate. 
Given the uncertain standard for substantive liability, the question 
arises as to what a plaintiff must plead in order to survive a motion to 
dismiss a claim. The pleading issue is regarded as the central point of 
Iqbal.265 It has been widely discussed elsewhere;266 I will discuss it briefly 
here. The Court put forward a distinction between pleadings that “are no 
more than conclusions”267—and thus not entitled to the assumption of 
truth—and “well-pleaded factual allegations [that might] plausibly give 
rise to an entitlement to relief.”268 Statements that at least implicitly 
contain legal conclusions run the risk of falling into the former category.269 
Thus, Iqbal’s use of terms like “willfully and maliciously,” “solely on 
account of his religion,” etc.,270 appeared to the majority to be nothing 
more than the “formulaic recitation” of a legal claim.271 The complaint did 
allege facts such as intentionally adopting “restrictive conditions of 
confinement.”272 However, the Court reasoned that the more “plausible” 
explanation for this conduct was a legitimate, penological one.273 
It will take lower courts some time to sort out the pleading implications 
of Iqbal. However, it is apparent that plaintiffs who have not yet had the 
                                                                                                                     
 264. Id. at 965 (citations omitted) (citing Wong v. United States, 373 F.3d 952, 966 (9th Cir. 
2004); Larez v. City of L.A., 946 F.2d 630, 646 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 265. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2008 Term: Leading Cases, 123 HARV. L. REV. 153, 252–
53 (2009) (discussing importance of Iqbal and impact on pleading stage of litigation).  
 266. E.g., Recent Case, D.C. Circuit Quashes Subpoenas for Congressman’s Testimony to the 
House Ethics Committee.—In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200 (D.C. Cir. 2009), 123 
HARV. L. REV. 564, 586–87 (2009) (discussing impact of Iqbal on international human rights 
litigation).  
 267. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).  
 268. Id. 
 269. See id. 
 270. Id. at 1951. 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 1951–52. 
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benefit of discovery will face a challenge in crafting complaints that satisfy 
the Court’s more stringent reading of Rule 8. The most likely response is 
highly detailed pleadings, with as much “factual” material as possible. 
Such a development might seem little more than a departure from the spirit 
of the Rules. However, the Iqbal Court indicated a willingness to take a 
complaint and decide more than just its sufficiency as a device to get the 
case started. The plausibility standard gives the defendant the opportunity 
to argue its case at the pleading stage, with the burden apparently on the 
plaintiff.274 However Iqbal plays out in the lower courts, it has the potential 
to make things harder for plaintiffs in reverse war on terror suits. It is no 
coincidence that Iqbal itself was such a suit.  
Iqbal was the first reverse war on terror suit decided by the Court in 
which the plaintiff sought damages instead of habeas corpus.275 In fact, 
Iqbal emerges, totally apart from its significance as a pleading case, as an 
important contribution to the doctrine of official immunity from damages 
suits. During the same term, in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court re-
emphasized the importance of qualified immunity as “‘an immunity from 
suit rather than a mere defense to liability.’”276 Iqbal makes clear the 
majority’s concern for the qualified immunity defense when officials are 
responding to “‘a national and international security emergency 
unprecedented in the history of the American Republic.’”277 Particularly 
significant is the Court’s receptivity to the breadth of the defendants’ 
collateral appeal of the denial of their qualified immunity defense, 
including their attack on the sufficiency of the complaint’s statement of a 
cause of action.278 The plaintiff argued that the defendants had presented “a 
qualified immunity appeal based solely on the complaint’s failure to state a 
claim and not on the ultimate issues relevant to the qualified immunity 
defense itself.”279 The majority, however, was unwilling to separate the 
issue of the clearly established nature of the plaintiff’s rights from the issue 
of whether he had sufficiently alleged that the defendants had violated 
them. The latter issue might be viewed as raising points closer to the 
merits—an “I didn’t do it” defense—but the Court saw the two as 
                                                                                                                     
 274. See The Supreme Court, 2008 Term: Leading Cases, supra note 265, at 261 (contending 
that Iqbal changes plausibility standard into a probability one).  
 275. The high profile cases from Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004), to Boumediene v. 
Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), all arose out of petitions for habeas corpus. So far this term, the Court 
has issued an opinion in a case testing a major anti-terrorist criminal statute. Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (holding statute to be constitutional as 
applied to petitioners). It has denied certiorari in private damages suits of the sort under discussion 
here. See Rasul II, 563 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1013 (2009); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 3409 (2010), but has granted 
certiorari in Al-Kidd.  
 276. 129 S. Ct. 808, 815 (2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). 
 277. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1953 (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 179 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(Cabranes, J., concurring)). 
 278. See id. at 1945–47 (discussing applicability of doctrine).  
 279. Id. at 1946.  
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“inextricably intertwined.”280 Indeed, the Court went further, reading 
Wilkie v. Robbins281 as precedent for considering Bivens cause of action 
issues on an appeal from a denial of qualified immunity.282 This approach 
makes sense if one views immunity broadly as a right not to face trial and 
discovery for accusations that are baseless or cannot serve as the basis of 
recovery. One can thus find in Iqbal a heightened pleading rule, a 
restrictive approach to supervisory liability, and a renewed emphasis on 
qualified immunity. The war on terror appears to have driven the Court’s 
analysis on all three points, and reverse war on terror plaintiffs may 
encounter each or all of them.   
4.  The State Secrets Privilege 
A plaintiff might successfully navigate all these threshold obstacles and 
still not reach the merits. A significant obstacle, particularly in suits 
involving the war on terror, is the state secrets privilege.283 “Under the 
state secrets doctrine, the United States may prevent the disclosure of 
information in a judicial proceeding if ‘there is a reasonable danger’ that 
such disclosure ‘will expose military matters which, in the interest of 
national security, should not be divulged.’”284 Building on the concept of 
“military,” both the Bush and Obama administrations have invoked the 
privilege in suits involving such war on terror matters as extraordinary 
rendition.285 Critics have long argued that the privilege runs counter to the 
legal system’s provision of relief through constitutional tort actions and, 
indeed, to Marbury itself.286 As Professor Robert Chesney puts it, 
“concerns for democratic accountability are especially acute when the 
privilege is asserted in the face of allegations of unconstitutional 
government conduct.”287 Courts differ over the extent to which the 
privilege operates to exclude evidence as opposed to the extent to which it 
operates as a rule of non-justiciability with respect to the entire subject 
matter of a particular suit.288 In Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.,289 a 
                                                                                                                     
 280. Id. (quoting Swint v. Chambers Cnty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)). 
 281. 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
 282. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1946.  But see Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 609 
(2009) (reaffirming general narrowness of collateral order doctrine). 
 283. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 124 (criticizing Bush administration’s extensive use of 
privilege in war on terror civil suits).   
 284. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. 
Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)). 
 285. See Editorial, supra note 50 (criticizing both administrations).  
 286. Cf. Amanda Frost, Essay, The State Secrets Privilege and Separation of Powers, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1931, 1962–63 (2007) (discussing Marbury within the context of the state secret 
privilege).  
 287. Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security Litigation, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1252–53 (2007).  
 288. See Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1197 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(discussing different approaches taken by courts). 
 289. 563 F.3d 992 (9th Cir. 2009), rev’d en banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010). 
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panel of the Ninth Circuit narrowed considerably the “very subject matter” 
concept and emphasized the role of the privilege with respect to specific 
evidentiary questions.290 The court expressed both separation of powers 
concerns about preserving the judiciary’s role and concern for the 
individual rights of those asserting harm from government action. 
However, on September 8, 2010, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, 
overruled the panel. The en banc majority viewed the case as one in which 
the claims were so “infused” with state secrets that any effort to defend 
against them “would create an unjustifiable risk” of revealing them.291 
Even under a restrictive view, however, the state secret scales are heavily 
weighted in the government’s favor. Exclusion of a single piece of 
evidence can force dismissal of a suit. It may make it impossible for the 
plaintiff to prove his claim,292 negate the defendant’s ability to mount a 
defense,293 or negate the plaintiff’s ability to demonstrate standing to 
proceed.294 Moreover, while courts purport to “balance,”295 the weighing 
process is limited. It is, at most, a partial balancing. It would seem that the 
greater the plaintiff’s need for the evidence, the more reluctant the court 
should be to find that the privilege attaches.296 However, “even the most 
compelling necessity cannot overcome the claim of privilege if the court is 
ultimately satisfied that” the privilege applies.297 Deference to the 
executive plays a role, of course, even if the court has exercised its 
authority to consider the matter in camera.298 Even if the government loses 
its claim of privilege, interlocutory review may be available.299 
At the moment, the privilege is the object of considerable attention, in 
large part because of the role it plays in war on terror litigation. Legislation 
to restrict its use has been proposed.300 The executive branch has 
promulgated limiting policies and procedures301 but continues to invoke 
the privilege.302 It is likely that the privilege will remain a significant factor 
in reverse war on terror litigation, although one must recognize that 
shifting attitudes toward the privilege could foreshadow a general pro-
                                                                                                                     
 290. Id. at 1003–04. 
 291. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc. 614 F.3d 1070, 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
 292. Cf. Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1001. 
 293. Cf. id. 
 294. Al-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190, 1205 (9th Cir. 2007).  
 295. E.g., Mohamed, 563 F.3d at 1003. 
 296. See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11 (1953). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Al-Haramain, 507 F.3d at 1203.  
 299. Cf. id. at 1196 (noting that “[t]he district court [sua sponte] certified order for 
interlocutory appeal” by plaintiff). 
 300. See generally State Secrets Protection Act, S. 417, 111th Cong. (2009). 
 301. See Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to the Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & 
Agencies, Policies and Procedures Governing Invocation of the State Secrets Privilege (Sept. 23, 
2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/state-secret-privileges.pdf. 
 302. See, e.g., Editorial, supra note 50.  
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plaintiff shift. 
5.  The Merits 
Although much of this Article’s focus is on threshold obstacles, it is 
important to consider what might happen down the road. The fact that a 
suit gets past all the problems listed above and makes it to the merits stage 
is no guarantee that it can serve as a full-scale accountability mechanism. 
The government might, for example, make a strategic decision to settle.303 
The key question is the extent to which the suit will serve the evaluative 
component of accountability through having the judiciary “say what the 
law is.”304 Suppose the judge’s rulings on all motions are favorable to the 
plaintiff and that any collateral appeals—of an immunity denial, for 
example—go his way. Suppose further that the judge’s instructions to the 
jury reflect the plaintiff’s view of the law. What is the end result if the jury 
returns a verdict for the defendant? The plaintiff has nothing to appeal. The 
appellate court will never get a chance to say what the law is with respect 
to the underlying legal claim beyond what it may have said about immunity 
and related issues. Some “law” will be made at this stage.305 Law will also 
be made, particularly on motions to dismiss, at the district court level. But 
the result is a piecemeal approach to accountability—within any one 
lawsuit—particularly if the defendant official wins and can claim 
vindication for his actions and the policies they represent. As for 
accountability resulting from the potential number of suits, the likelihood 
of widely differing results undercuts the goal of uniformity that seems 
implicit in the notion of accountability as a guide to future action. 
The notion of plaintiffs losing is not fanciful. Any group of lawsuits 
will produce a mix of winners and losers. The reverse war on terror suit 
seems likely to produce more of the latter. Bivens actions in particular are 
regarded as usually ending in defeat for the plaintiff.306 Reverse war on 
terror suits may produce a strong combination of attractive defendants—
officials who were protecting the country, perhaps overzealously—and, 
frequently, unattractive plaintiffs. 
For those who see the civil suit as an opportunity to bring the Bush 
                                                                                                                     
 303. See Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F. Supp. 2d 104, 121 (D.D.C. 2005). The government settled 
Hatfill’s case. See Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Scientist Is Paid Millions by U.S. in Anthrax Suit, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2008, at A1.  
 304. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  
 305. Professor Aziz Huq refers to “policy arbitrage through procedural manipulation.” Aziz Z. 
Huq, Against National Security Exceptionalism, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 225, 234 n.40. 
 306. See, e.g., Zaring, supra note 71, at 319 (“[T]he Supreme Court . . . has been almost 
uniformly hostile to would-be plaintiffs since 1982.”). But see Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the 
Success of Bivens Litigation and its Consequences for the Individual Liability Model, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 809, 813 (2010) (contending that Bivens actions succeed more frequently than is generally 
assumed). The question on which I am focusing is the extension of Bivens availability to claims that 
might be viewed as novel, as opposed to the more frequent suit arising out of prison or police 
contexts. 
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administration to the heel of judicial accountability, the merits pose an 
additional risk: judgment for the defendants might include an element of 
judicial justification of their acts. Let us assume a suit in which the 
plaintiff makes a strong case that he possessed a constitutional right (or 
rights) that was violated and in which the defendant does not contest the 
facts. It is still open to the defendant to argue that he was entitled to violate 
the right. In Iqbal, some defendants advanced the argument that “even if 
the law was clearly established as to the existence of a right claimed to 
have been violated, it was not clearly established in the extraordinary 
circumstances of the 9/11 attack and its aftermath.”307 This argument, 
advanced as a claim of immunity, may be based on Judge Posner’s concept 
of varying constitutional rights.308 It is possible that courts will be 
receptive to the concept of rights that diminish in the context of the war on 
terror. It is also possible that courts will consider favorably the argument 
that this context gives defendant officials greater authority to infringe 
whatever rights the plaintiffs possessed. Although unsuccessful, the Iqbal 
defendants argued that “the Government was entitled to take certain 
actions that might not have been lawful before 9/11 because the 
Government’s interests assumed special weight in the post-9/11 
context.”309 The Bush Justice Department discussed these concepts 
extensively in evaluating possible prosecutions of officials for torture.310 
An Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memorandum emphasized the public 
policy concerns that underlie the defenses of “necessity” and “self-
defense.”311 For example, the OLC stated its belief “that a claim by an 
individual of the defense of another would be . . . supported by the fact 
that, in this case, the nation is under attack and has the right to self-
defense.”312 The OLC analysis has been criticized.313 More importantly, it 
is not clear how these concepts derived from the criminal law would apply 
to civil suits. But suppose there is some judicial endorsement of either 
defense. A court has spoken; evaluation has taken place. This seems a 
perfectly acceptable result if accountability is viewed as a two-way street.  
In sum, the civil suit emerges as a possible accountability mechanism. It 
is perhaps closer to the retributive model than to the inquiry model, but it 
does bring into play the impartiality and legitimacy of the judicial system. 
                                                                                                                     
 307. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 159 (2d Cir. 2007) rev’d sub nom. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 308. See supra text accompanying notes 235–37.  
 309. Iqbal, 490 F.3d at 159. 
 310. Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S. Bybee, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE MEMOS 41, 90 –99 (David Cole ed., 
2009). 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).  
 313. See, e.g., THE TORTURE MEMOS, supra note 185, at 23–24. But see Pines, supra note 33, 
at 143–53 (defending practice of Attorney General opinions and reliance thereon as a defense to 
criminal and civil suits). 
38
Florida Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 6
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss1/6
2011] ACCOUNTABILITY, LIABILITY, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 231 
 
It can be seen as a default version of the commission model. Moreover, as 
far as involving the judicial system is concerned, the civil damages suit is 
the only game in town. Injunctive actions and prosecutions each face 
numerous hurdles,314 and are unlikely to play a significant role as 
accountability mechanisms. At the same time, the civil tort suit faces 
serious problems as well. This Article thus turns to the obvious next 
question: given the fact that war on terror civil suits do not constitute a 
radical new species of litigation, and given their potential to serve as 
accountability mechanisms, why does the legal system throw so many 
obstacles in their paths?  
IV.  WHAT EXPLAINS THE SYSTEMIC RESISTANCE TO REVERSE WAR ON 
TERROR ACTIONS? 
A.  General Considerations 
The civil suit (usually a Bivens action) seems well-positioned to play 
the role of accountability mechanism. It can contribute to all four stages of 
accountability: informing; justification; evaluation; and rectification, 
defined as compensation, sanctions, and deterrence/guidance.315 The notion 
of important public law decisions being made through adjudication 
is hardly a novel one. Yet, the legal system makes reverse war on 
terror suits extraordinarily difficult to bring. As the Second Circuit put 
it: “Our federal system of checks and balances provides means to 
consider allegedly unconstitutional executive policy, but a private action 
for . . . damages . . . is not one of them.”316 In this Part, I examine why, and 
I consider two possible explanations. The first—developed in section B—
is what might be labeled as “institutional concerns.” The notion here is that 
the limits of the tort suit make such actions unsuitable vehicles for the 
broad policy determinations that accountability seems to require, especially 
when those decisions are cast in constitutional stone. The analysis 
considers arguments on both sides and concludes that the institutional 
arguments against the tort suit have some weight but are hardly dispositive. 
Section C argues that the crucial variable is that the suits under 
consideration involve the war on terror. Concerns about the role of the 
judiciary in national security become central. Deference to the political 
branches becomes, in effect, a “special factor counseling hesitation” in a 
general sense. 
B.  Their Finest Hour—the “Public Law” Litigation and its Bearing on 
Tort Suits 
Injunctive relief, particularly against Bush administration officials, is 
                                                                                                                     
 314. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.  
 315. See supra notes 56–63 and accompanying text. 
 316. Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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largely unavailable to war on terror plaintiffs attacking policies. Yet, 
paradoxically, the notion of courts as accountability mechanisms derives 
much of its force from a form of injunctive action that played a central role 
in late 20th Century debates about the role of courts in America—the 
institutional reform or “public law” litigation made famous by Professor 
Abram Chayes.317 Chayes focused on litigation aimed at a wide variety of 
governmental practices,318 and he insisted that “[w]e are witnessing the 
emergence of a new model of civil litigation.”319 Salient characteristics of 
this new model included the increasing importance of equitable relief, a 
strong judicial effect on future events, awareness of the policy functions of 
litigation and its impact on persons not before the court, a willingness to 
engage in the sort of broad fact-finding engaged in by legislatures, and the 
central role of the judicial decree.320 Indeed, the suits were portrayed as 
giving access to political power to those who lacked it.321 
A major theme of the proponents of this litigation, such as Chayes and 
Professor Owen Fiss,322 was their attempt to legitimize a broad societal 
role for the courts—one that is central to any attempt to use them as 
accountability mechanisms, whatever form the action may take. Chayes 
found legitimacy in “the ability of a judicial pronouncement to sustain 
itself” in a continuous dialogue with “other political elements,” including 
“the press and wider publics.”323 Within this dialogue, “judicial action 
[could] only achieve[] . . . legitimacy by responding to, indeed by stirring, 
the deep and durable demand for justice in our society.”324 The public law-
suits of the late 20th Century were thus direct descendants of Marbury.325 
Scholarly interest in these suits continues.326 
Current attempts to use the courts as war on terror accountability 
mechanisms draw on the public law model as a source of legitimacy. David 
Zaring states that “[t]he high profile policy-directed tort suit[s]” are “in 
some ways inheriting the mantel of institutional reform litigation.”327 They 
                                                                                                                     
 317. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281 passim (1976).  
 318. See id. at 1284. 
 319. Id. at 1282. 
 320. See id. at 1292–1302. 
 321. See id. at 1315.  
 322. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) (“The function of a judge is to give concrete meaning and application to 
our constitutional values.”). 
 323. Chayes, supra note 317, at 1316. 
 324. Id. 
 325. See id. (contrasting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), with Lochner v. 
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
 326. See generally Joanna C. Schwartz, Myths and Mechanics of Deterrence: The Role of 
Lawsuits in Law Enforcement Decisionmaking, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1023 (2010) (discussing various 
analyses regarding deterrent effects of civil litigation on government officials and contending that 
access to useful information about suits should play a central role). 
 327. Zaring, supra note 71, at 338–39.  
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become almost “an alternative form of administration as well. The suits 
certainly seek to constrain government officials, and if they do not often 
succeed in that, they do garner attention, which may, ultimately, generate 
political coalitions to provide the relief that doctrine does not.”328 The suits 
in question may be tort actions, but their scope is often broader than any 
defendant or group of defendants. As Professor Amar points out, 
“[p]ervasive and systematic illegality will not always be traceable to 
specific individuals who can be called to account.”329  
The mantel only extends so far, however. Tort suits are quite different 
from equitable actions in such key matters as fact-finding, retrospective as 
opposed to prospective relief, range of participation, and remedial powers 
of the trial judge. Another important difference is that the public law 
actions drew much of their legitimacy from the fact that federal judicial 
power was exercised largely over state and local institutions. The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides direct support for supervision of these 
institutions. Even in this context, the Court expressed reservations about 
ongoing federal judicial control over state military (National Guard) 
actions.330 On the other hand, federal judges may feel a “special political 
vulnerability”331 when asked to oversee, even indirectly, policies and 
activities of their co-ordinate branches.  
There are obviously other limits to the role that individual tort suits can 
play as forums about national policy. Consider the following observations 
by a congressional committee, as quoted by a federal court: 
“[T]he development of the law regulating electronic 
surveillance for national security purposes has been uneven 
and inconclusive. This is to be expected where the 
development is left to the judicial branch in an area where 
cases do not regularly come before it. Moreover, the 
development of standards and restrictions by the judiciary 
with respect to electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
purposes accomplished through case law threatens both civil 
liberties and the national security because that development 
occurs generally in ignorance of the facts, circumstances, and 
techniques of foreign intelligence electronic surveillance not 
present in the particular case before the court.  
. . . [T]he tiny window to this area which a particular case 
affords provides inadequate light by which judges may be 
relied upon to develop case law which adequately balances 
the rights of privacy and national security.”332 
                                                                                                                     
 328. Id. at 339. 
 329. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1487 (1987). 
 330. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5–10 (1973). 
 331. Amar, supra note 329, at 1508.  
 332. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1109, 1119–20 
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These concerns are not limited to the field of national security. The tort 
suit does not usually examine generalized manifestations of a phenomenon. 
It is restricted to a particular claim and defenses to it. Parties do not engage 
in a broad-ranging search for truth; they strive to convince the fact-finder 
of a particular narrative, to discredit alternative versions, and to exclude 
evidence that does not support their views. Trial courts do not have the 
fact-finding resources of a legislature. Moreover, the central role of the jury 
introduces a wild card. The equity courts at the center of the public law 
model utilize a more “polycentric” party structure than the adversarial 
model and can benefit from broader fact-finding capabilities. The contrast 
with the commission model is even sharper. Commissions such as the 9/11 
Commission have a broad mandate and broad leeway in getting there. They 
are not party driven, encumbered by rules of evidence, or necessarily 
limited to highly fact-specific determinations. In ideal form, they should 
lack the partisan nature that the adversarial quality of lawsuits could 
engender.  
Nonetheless, I do not think that the aspects of the tort action discussed 
above—particularly the “tiny window critique”—necessarily disqualify it 
from playing an important role as an accountability mechanism. We have 
posited the goals of accountability to be the following: discovery and 
exposition of official conduct; explanation and justification by the 
officials; evaluation of the conduct’s legality by an authoritative source; 
and rectification, defined as compensation and the imposition of sanctions, 
if appropriate, norm articulation that will deter the particular officials if 
necessary, and provision of guidance for officials in the future.333 In terms 
of achieving these goals, a tort suit of the Bivens or similar variety that 
proceeds to the merits looks pretty good. The facts are aired and “found.” 
The official’s defense will almost certainly offer a justification. Judicial 
opinions, particularly at the appellate stage, will evaluate that defense. 
Compensation may be awarded. A successful suit will provide deterrence. 
The opinions, both on merits issues and on collateral matters such as 
immunity, will provide guidance.  
An additional reason for viewing favorably the tort action as an 
accountability mechanism is the legitimacy factor. Federal court judgments 
are generally viewed as legitimate, particularly in the area of constitutional 
law,334 and Bivens actions are a form of constitutional adjudication. The 
legitimacy of any “judgment” about an aspect of the Bush administration’s 
anti-terrorism policies is an extremely important point. The subject is 
intensely controversial and political. If those who oppose the judgment can 
attack the institution that rendered it—say for being too political or too 
partisan—its ability to serve the broader goals of accountability is 
                                                                                                                     
(N.D. Cal. 2008) (quoting PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE 
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 21 (1978)).  
 333. See supra text accompanying notes 56–63. 
 334. Cf. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (discussing the “basic principle” of federal 
judicial supremacy in constitutional law).  
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compromised. I do not seek to somehow wish away objections to a 
substantial judicial role in national governance—questions such as the 
“counter-majoritarian” difficulty,335 for example. Indeed, such objections 
may be particularly acute in the national security area when the courts 
place themselves at odds with the political branches. One of the theses of 
this Article is that there are substantial reasons—referred to in shorthand 
form as deference and discussed in the next section—for courts not to do 
this. But that thesis does not rest on any notion of the courts’ illegitimacy 
as deciders of major public issues. Indeed, it is the very fact of their 
legitimacy that might lead one to accept their default role as accountability 
mechanisms to review Bush-era anti-terrorism policies. 
Any discussion of the legitimacy of the tort suit as an accountability 
mechanism would be incomplete without a reference to Professor Lon 
Fuller’s analysis of courts as articulators of public values through the 
process of adjudication.336 Fuller’s views are sometimes presented as 
focused on a narrow “dispute resolution model” as opposed to the broader 
“public law model” discussed above.337 Professor Robert Bone has 
persuasively challenged this notion.338 For Bone, “Fuller viewed 
adjudication as a profoundly public institution with a vitally important 
social function. It was through the process of adjudication that reason was 
applied to the task of developing frameworks to order the ongoing process 
of human interaction, including the articulation of public norms.”339 For 
Fuller, the sharply focused adversary process permits the judge to see a 
problem from all relevant sides. He described the fact “of advocacy [as] 
not a concession to the frailties of human nature, but an expression of 
human insight in the design of a social framework within which man’s 
capacity for impartial judgment can attain its fullest realization.”340 Bone 
summarized “the core purpose of adjudication” as follows: “By focusing 
on actual disputes, the process of adjudication brought the abstract into 
productive relation with the concrete. Courts learned about the specifics of 
context at the same time as they reasoned about the implications of general 
principle.”341  
There are, however, three problems that stand in the way of a perfect fit 
between civil suits and the desire for accountability in the context of Bush 
era war on terror policies. The first is that the “tiny window” problem is 
particularly acute in suits that amount to constitutionally based attacks on 
                                                                                                                     
 335. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE 
BAR OF POLITICS 16 (1962). 
 336. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 363–65 
(1978). 
 337. Robert G. Bone, Lon Fuller’s Theory of Adjudication and the False Dichotomy Between 
Dispute Resolution and Public Law Models of Litigation, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1273, 1274–75 (1995).  
 338. See id. at 1279–82.  
 339. Id. at 1282. 
 340. Fuller, supra note 336, at 384.  
 341. Bone, supra note 337, at 1305.  
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entire policies. No one suit can address an entire issue. Claims will arise 
out of specific “transaction[s] or occurrence[s].”342 Thus, we see discrete 
suits concerning such matters as “extraordinary rendition,” conditions of 
confinement, the consequences of high-level legal advice, and alleged 
misuse of detention of material witnesses. These constitutional tort suits 
will raise—and decide—important constitutional questions as part of 
challenges to national policies. Yet, the matters at issue may not be 
representative of the general policy. It might be contended that a policy is 
essentially a method for dealing with a wide, unknown number of similar 
incidents and that a decision that evaluates one instance of treatment of a 
problem sheds light on the entire method. However, the incident giving 
rise to a particular claim may not be representative of the universe of 
potential incidents that generated the policy. Public interest lawyers, for 
example, may focus on egregious events in order to discredit an entire 
policy that, viewed in its entirety, serves important governmental interests. 
Iqbal’s generous treatment of the defendants’ motives in rounding up 
Muslim men343 seems to reflect a recognition that a discrete set of facts can 
obscure the reasons for a generalized course of action.  
Moreover, the various policies that make up the war on terror, for 
which accountability is sought, have yielded a number of tort suits. They 
will proceed at different paces and yield conflicting results. It is hard to 
reconcile, for example, the Second Circuit’s finding of Bivens “special 
factors” in  Arar v. Ashcroft344 with the California district court’s refusal to 
find them in Padilla v. Yoo.345 Rulings on the state secrets privilege will 
differ,346 as will those on supervisory liability.347 Some cases may actually 
go to trial; others may settle; others may be disposed of on non-merits 
grounds; others may fall by the wayside. The multiplicity of suits 
substantially weakens the goal of authoritative elaboration. It is not an 
answer to say that someday the Supreme Court will step in to provide 
answers. “Someday” could take years. If we want an accounting while the 
Bush era is still fresh in our memories, and if we want guidance about what 
to do about terrorism now, civil suits may not be the answer. 
A second problem is that, despite the arguments advanced by Fuller and 
others, judges have frequently questioned the use of the tort suit as a 
vehicle to question broad governmental decisions. A well-known example 
                                                                                                                     
 342. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
 343. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,  129 S. Ct.  1937, 1951–52 (2009). 
 344. 585 F.3d 559, 563–64 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
 345. 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1025 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss, with the 
exception of a single claim dismissed with leave to amend); see also Brown, supra note 16, at 880–
81 (discussing different approaches in the two decisions). 
 346. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 F.3d 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(discussing alternative approaches to privilege),  rev’d, 579 F.3d 943 (9th Cir. 2009), and aff’d en 
banc, 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010).  
 347. The approach to supervisory liability found in Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 964–65 
(9th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 79 U.S.L.W. 3062 (U.S. Oct. 18, 2010) (No. 10-98), seems at 
variance with the Supreme Court’s views on supervisory liability as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 
S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  
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is United States v. Varig Airlines,348 a statutory case involving the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, in which the Supreme Court cited Congress’s desire to 
“prevent judicial ‘second-guessing’ of legislative and administrative 
decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the 
medium of an action in tort.”349 In Schneider v. Kissinger,350 a 2005 
decision with a distinct war on terror flavor,351 the District of Columbia 
Circuit declared that “recasting foreign policy and national security 
questions in tort terms does not provide standards for making or reviewing 
foreign policy judgments.”352 Moreover, the court seemed willing to extend 
the shield of policy to the means of implementing it, at least where those 
means were implicit in the original policy.353 In the court’s view, “[t]o 
determine whether drastic measures should be taken in matters of foreign 
policy and national security is not the stuff of adjudication but of 
policymaking.”354 Of course, in a constitutional tort suit, a policy and the 
means of executing it may blend into one claim, a possibility that the 
Schneider court seemed to foresee.355  
In the constitutional context, opponents of the Bivens action have long 
expressed a preference for equitable relief and doubts about the basic 
concept of a “constitutional tort.” Dissenting in Carlson v. Green,356 
Justice Rehnquist noted the long-established “power of federal courts to 
grant equitable relief for constitutional violations,” citing Marbury as an 
example.357  
“The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the 
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the 
necessities of the particular case. Flexibility rather than 
rigidity has distinguished it. The qualities of mercy and 
practicality have made equity the instrument for nice 
adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest and 
private needs as well as between competing private 
                                                                                                                     
 348. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). 
 349. Id. at 814. The Court earlier pointed to legislative history in which a government official 
stated that “[i]t is neither desirable nor intended that the constitutionality of legislation, the legality 
of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary administrative act should be tested through the 
medium of a damage suit for tort.” Id. at 809–10; see also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 
27 (1953). 
 350. 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 351. The case involved claims arising out of a CIA effort to destabilize a socialist government 
in Chile. Id. at 191–92. 
 352. Id. at 197.  
 353. See id. at 198.  
 354. Id. at 197.  
 355. Id. at 197–98. 
 356. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
 357. Id. at 42 & n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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claims.”358 
These arguments bear some similarity to those of the original Bivens 
dissenters.359 Indeed, although the Bivens doctrine is still alive, the 
Supreme Court has engaged in a substantial retrenchment beginning in the 
1980s.360 It is clear that the Court regarded several of these suits as directed 
at policy beyond merely presenting claims for redress of a distinct tort.361  
Justice Rehnquist returned to the subject in his dissent in Butz v. 
Economou.362 He reiterated the point that Marbury “involved equitable-
type relief by way of mandamus or injunction.”363 More importantly, he 
stressed:  
[T]he threat of injunctive relief without the possibility of 
damages in the case of a Cabinet official is a better tailoring 
of the competing need to vindicate individual rights, on the 
one hand, and the equally vital need, on the other, that federal 
officials exercising discretion will be unafraid to take 
vigorous action to protect the public interest.364  
The notion that tort suits play less of a role in vindicating the public 
interest resurfaced in Nixon v. Fitzgerald.365 The Court distinguished a 
“merely private suit for damages” from “an ongoing criminal prosecution” 
or an action to maintain the separation of powers.366 It is, of course, true 
that courts—particularly state courts—have long made governmental 
policy through the processes of the common law. Tort cases are a strong 
example. In the constitutional area, individual criminal cases are often the 
vehicles for important new rules.367 Outside that area, however, we are 
                                                                                                                     
 358. Id. at 43 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329–30 (1944)). 
 359. See Bandes, supra note 79, at 299–303 (comparing Rehnquist dissent with the Bivens 
dissents).   
 360. See Brown, supra note 16, at 858–61. 
 361. For example, the Court in Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), cited “federal personnel 
policy.” Id. at 380–81. In United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987), the Court stated that 
“congressionally uninvited intrusion into military affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate.” Id. at 
683. 
 362. 438 U.S. 478 (1978). 
 363. Id. at 523 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Court in Boumediene referred to habeas 
corpus as an equitable remedy. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 780 (2008). Referring to habeas 
corpus actions, Professor Huq argues that a development along these lines can be found in national 
security litigation when “de facto structural injunctions” lead to “significant change in national 
security programs,” although he notes that those bringing the actions may receive few benefits.  
Huq, supra note 305, at 248. 
 364. Butz, 438 U.S. at 524. 
 365. 457 U.S. 731 (1982).  
 366. Id. at 754 & n.37.   
 367. E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“We hold that all evidence obtained by 
searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a 
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used to constitutional law on such vital matters as desegregation, abortion, 
school prayer, and free speech being made primarily in equitable actions.368 
It is not coincidental that the Supreme Court’s retreat from Bivens began 
with cases aimed at the structure of governmental programs or underlying 
policies.369 A single tort decision can bring an entire national program to a 
halt. The core of the problem is whether one views constitutional tort suits 
as taking courts too far beyond their adjudicative function or whether one 
agrees with Professor Bandes’ contention that “the courts’ particularization 
function inevitably involves precedent setting and norm creation. The 
difference between decisions that bind discrete parties and those that bind 
large groups is a matter of degree, not of kind.”370  
A third institutional problem is that some reverse war on terror suits can 
be seen as political maneuvers in which political actors—seeking to 
perform the role of private attorneys general—utilize the tort system for 
purposes other than the resolution of disputes. Professor David Zaring has 
analyzed the “[c]onstitutional [t]ort [a]gainst [p]olicy.”371 He describes 
“high-profile cases [in which] winning the lawsuit is less precisely the 
point than is practicing increasingly personal politics while calling 
attention to a policy and a plight.”372 For Zaring, “[t]hese suits are more 
symbolic than likely to succeed, in that they rely not on the verdict, but on 
the ability to make a claim against a policy-maker.”373 
Professor Margulies views them as part of the “vast repertoire” of 
“crossover advocacy.”374 This advocacy can include enlisting the media 
and foreign governments as well as academic scholarship and damages 
suits.375 Margulies also sees the potential political dimension. He 
characterizes Jose Padilla’s suit against John Yoo as “[u]sing [l]itigation to 
                                                                                                                     
state court.”). 
 368. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973). The First Amendment area might be 
viewed as an exception, in that a substantial number of free speech cases have been criminal 
actions. E.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 369. See Brown, supra note 16, at 883. 
 370. Bandes, supra note 79, at 305 (footnotes omitted). Professor Huq advocates emphasis on 
remedies because “[i]t invites particular scrutiny of the question whether an individual judgment’s 
effect rippled out to change larger institutional practices.” Huq, supra note 305, at 234. His view of 
damage suits seems ambiguous. At one point he describes them as “a means to challenge isolated 
acts of abuse, but no avenue for effecting larger programmatic change.” Id. at 243. But see id. at 252 
(discussing view that constitutional tort litigation “limits future options by articulating new 
constitutional norms to constrain subsequent executives”). Tort suits may also present the risk of 
what Professor Margulies calls “hindsight bias.” See Margulies, supra note 192, at 204 (describing 
hindsight bias as that which “makes every official mistake seem avoidable”). This article is an 
excellent overview of the role of Bivens actions in the national security context.  
 371. Zaring, supra note 71, at 331–39.  
 372. Id. at 332. 
 373. Id. at 335.  
 374. Margulies, supra note 74, at 348.  
 375. See id. at 364–72.  
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[s]ettle [i]deological [s]cores.”376 
Of course, many controversial lawsuits can be criticized as “political,” 
including such staples as desegregation actions, challenges to legislative 
apportionment, and claims of politically motivated personnel actions. 
Similarly, the notion of the private attorney general is not new, although it 
is best known in the different context of congressional authorization of 
suits against private parties and governments, mainly at the state and local 
level.377 Like “political” lawsuits, it can be controversial. On the one hand, 
Professor Pamela Karlan applauds it for going beyond Marbury and its 
emphasis on private disputes to putting courts in a position where they 
“‘explicate and give force’” to public values.378 On the other hand, 
Professor Jeremy Rabkin warns that “[t]hose who disagree with the 
political agenda of the lawyers will not be pleased to see them advance it 
through litigation. The lawyers can say they are performing a public 
service, but others will see their role as partisan.”379 The point is sharply 
illustrated by the fact that legal support for many reverse war on terror suits 
has come from vigorous opponents of the Bush administration and its 
policies. 
Neither Margulies nor Zaring seems to view the label “political” as 
fatal. Margulies is clearly sympathetic to war on terror detainees and their 
lawyers. He seems mainly concerned with pointing out the risks of 
crossover advocacy, including unintended consequences,380 and with 
cautioning those who engage in it to look before they leap.381 Zaring’s 
position is also ambiguous but tilting more to the negative side. He sees 
symbolic value in the suits and presents them as providing “a sort of 
democratic access” to government leaders.382 He also sees the tiny window 
problem as an advantage of decentralized governance: “[I]t tracks issues 
into specific, small-scale, problem-solving institutions, like particular cases 
overseen by particular courts.”383 However, he questions the enforcement 
value of suits that are rarely won,384 and he also questions the value of 
“symbolism without . . .  substance.”385 To the extent that lawsuits portend 
“an alternative form of administration,” Zaring is dubious about its 
success. 386 
                                                                                                                     
 376. Id. at 409.  
 377. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. 
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 379. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
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 380. See Margulies, supra note 74, at 413–21. 
 381. See id. at 422. 
 382. Zaring, supra note 71, at 317–18.   
 383. Id. at 366. 
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 385. Id. at 358.  
 386. Id. at 339.  
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Although they do not view “political” as fatal, both analysts express 
grave concern about the political nature of the war on terror civil suits. 
Zaring asks the following question: “[A]lthough courts are not letting 
purely political claims proceed, the plaintiffs who sue are often quite 
political—and, as we have discussed, the criminal cases against high 
government officials have also been rather politicized themselves. Is such a 
political process worth it?”387 
Margulies raises another concern: 
Crossover advocates’ targeting of Yoo and other 
administration officials also threatens political polarization, of 
the kind that was routine during the era of the Independent 
Counsel statute. Prosecuting senior officials for war crimes 
might trigger prosecutions of political officials of the other 
party in a subsequent administration. The imperatives of 
partisan payback might squeeze out any hope of bipartisan 
problem-solving.388 
For purposes of this Article, the emphasis on “political” raises two 
questions: Does the political nature of the suits threaten the legitimacy of 
courts that entertain them? And does the accompanying adversariness 
vitiate the courts’ abilities to serve as accountability mechanisms? As to 
the first, as noted above, many lawsuits can be characterized as political. 
The label does not somehow delegitimize them or the courts that hear 
them. Moreover, it is hard to distinguish suits that are political—or too 
political—from those that are not and that “should” be heard. One could 
even argue that the aptly named political question doctrine performs this 
function with some success. As I have contended elsewhere,389 the courts 
may have incorporated political questioning reasoning into the Bivens 
threshold inquiry. Perhaps the result is to help screen out political reverse 
war on terror suits. As for adversariness, it is endemic to the judicial 
process and to any recourse to it. Thus, the second question asked above 
simply begs the larger question of the extent to which the (inherently 
adversarial) judicial process (particularly the civil suit) should constitute an 
integral part of the broader search for accountability for the anti-terrorism 
policies of the Bush administration. 
Institutional concerns do pose problems. However, by themselves, they 
may not be sufficiently severe to block a broad role for the judicial process 
in the form of the civil suit. There is no basic problem of legitimacy as 
long as one accepts the judicial function in constitutional adjudication and 
recognizes that our society has long looked to adjudication as a source for 
the development and exposition of public values in the course of resolving 
disputes. The arguments that the suits in question seem political or that 
                                                                                                                     
 387. Id. at 358 (footnote omitted). 
 388. Margulies, supra note 74, at 416 (footnote omitted).  
 389. See Brown, supra note 16, at 889–92. 
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they run counter to a preference for equity over law in constitutional 
adjudication have weight, but do not seem dispositive. The experience of 
§ 1983 suits against state and local governments—legal as well as 
equitable—is particularly relevant. However, we must again face the 
question as to whether § 1983 suits and Bivens actions are truly parallel. In 
particular, war on terror Bivens actions not only pit the federal courts 
against the political branches, but they also do so in the area of national 
security.  
C.  The Obstacles to Civil Suits as an Example of National Security 
Deference 
It is, of course, a truism that suits challenging aspects of the war on 
terror inevitably run into the precept that the judiciary should show 
considerable deference to the political branches on issues of national 
security.390 “National security,” in this context, can have a broad meaning, 
although its genesis appears to be found in cases presenting military 
issues.391 Thus, one could develop the thesis that reverse war on terror suits 
are hard to bring because they often encounter deference-based obstacles. 
These might include the following: the notions of national security 
concerns as special factors counseling hesitation in allowing Bivens claims, 
the use of the state secrets privilege to thwart or limit a suit, or a special 
claim of immunity in the war on terror context.  
I want to suggest a different way of looking at the phenomenon. 
Consider the possibility that national security deference to the political 
branches, particularly the executive, is built into the constitutional 
system392 and that a consistent refusal to allow war on terror civil suits to 
proceed past the threshold reflects that deference. Rather than simply a set 
of discrete, articulated doctrines that affect portions of the suits, there is a 
broader, unarticulated doctrine disfavoring them generally. National 
security deference reaches its zenith in the war on terror context.  
The Supreme Court suggested as much in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.393 In 
rejecting the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s complaint, it noted that “the 
Nation’s top law enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating 
terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most secure 
conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist 
activity.”394 I find implicit in these remarks the notion that such decisions 
                                                                                                                     
 390. E.g., Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 574–76 (2d Cir. 2009).  
 391. See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 529–30 (1988). 
 392. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The “Enemy Combatant” Cases in Historical Context: The 
Inevitability of Pragmatic Judicial Review, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1023 (2007) (describing 
the Supreme Court’s treatment of national defense issues as a “compromise approach of taking 
jurisdiction but showing healthy deference to the political branches”). Professor Robert Pushaw’s 
highly important contributions to the subject of deferential judicial review are discussed infra in the 
text accompanying notes 401–26.  
 393. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 394. Id. at 1952. 
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are not to be second-guessed in a tort suit. Especially given the extensive 
discussion of the national security context, the notion is explicit in the 
Second Circuit’s statement in Arar that “[o]ur federal system of checks and 
balances provides means to consider allegedly unconstitutional executive 
policy, but a private action for money damages against individual 
policymakers is not one of them.”395   
The question can be rephrased as asking whether national security 
deference is case-specific or whether it applies generally to reverse war on 
terror suits, viewed as a single phenomenon. A typical quote, from the 
Fourth Circuit decision in El-Masri v. United States,396 suggests a general 
approach in the context of a case involving the state secrets privilege: 
The Reynolds Court balanced those concerns by leaving 
the judiciary firmly in control of deciding whether an 
executive assertion of the state secrets privilege is valid, but 
subject to a standard mandating restraint in the exercise of its 
authority. A court is obliged to honor the Executive's 
assertion of the privilege if it is satisfied, “from all the 
circumstances of the case, that there is a reasonable danger 
that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters 
which, in the interest of national security, should not be 
divulged.” In assessing the risk that such a disclosure might 
pose to national security, a court is obliged to accord the 
“utmost deference” to the responsibilities of the executive 
branch. Such deference is appropriate not only for 
constitutional reasons, but also practical ones: the Executive 
and the intelligence agencies under his control occupy a 
position superior to that of the courts in evaluating the 
consequences of a release of sensitive information. In the 
related context of confidentiality classification decisions, we 
have observed that “[t]he courts, of course, are ill-equipped to 
become sufficiently steeped in foreign intelligence matters to 
serve effectively in the review of secrecy classifications in 
that area.” The executive branch's expertise in predicting the 
potential consequences of intelligence disclosures is 
particularly important given the sophisticated nature of 
modern intelligence analysis, in which “[t]he significance of 
one item of information may frequently depend upon 
knowledge of many other items of information,” and “[w]hat 
may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great 
moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may 
put the questioned item of information in its proper context.” 
In the same vein, in those situations where the state secrets 
privilege has been invoked because disclosure risks impairing 
                                                                                                                     
 395. Arar, 585 F.3d at 574. 
 396. 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007).  
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our foreign relations, the President's assessment of the 
diplomatic situation is entitled to great weight.397 
Lack of judicial competence, in particular, is a recurring theme, one 
which the Supreme Court accepted as recently as Munaf v. Geren,398 
decided the same day as Boumediene.399 In response to a challenge to the 
executive’s decision that the plaintiffs were not likely to be tortured if 
remitted to the Iraqi judicial system, the Supreme Court said that “[t]he 
Judiciary is not suited to second-guess such determinations— 
determinations that would require federal courts to pass judgment on 
foreign justice systems and undermine the Government’s ability to speak 
with one voice in this area.”400 
In developing the deference explanation, I have drawn heavily on the 
seminal treatment of deference in the writings of Professor Robert 
Pushaw.401 Pushaw views the Supreme Court as having adopted “the 
compromise approach of taking jurisdiction but showing healthy deference 
to the political branches.”402 There is, of course, a wide range of views 
among academics as to the desirability of deference. Professor Geoffrey 
Stone argues that decision-makers are particularly prone to failure in times 
of crisis.403 They are liable to be too quick to exaggerate dangers and to 
sacrifice civil liberties.404 Professor Chesney cautions against undue 
judicial deference to the political branches at the expense of the courts’ 
recognition of their own competence.405 For the purposes of this 
discussion, I will take Professor Pushaw’s description as an accurate 
portrayal of current judicial practice. Certainly, the recent decision in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project406 is a strong example of national 
security deference. I will also use “deference” in a general sense without 
attempting to distinguish between narrow issues of fact and broader issues 
of policy.407 
There is an important difference, however, between what I view as the 
current situation—deference manifested by making a class of suits virtually 
                                                                                                                     
 397. Id. at 304–05 (internal citations omitted). 
 398. 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008).   
 399. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 400. Munaf, 128 S. Ct. at 2226. 
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impossible to bring—and Pushaw’s favored solution. He views the 
Article III federal courts as having a necessary role to play when military 
and foreign affairs considerations can impact individual rights, as in the 
war on terror.408 Reviewing doctrine and case law from the founding to the 
present, Pushaw presents the following analysis: “[F]ederal judges have 
always entertained claims that military decisions have violated individual 
rights, albeit under very forgiving standards and with an awareness of 
political realities. I believe that such lenient judicial review is appropriate, 
and I would not endorse complete judicial abdication except in very rare 
and limited circumstances.”409 Deference is thus seen as close to, but less 
severe than, non-justiciability. In the reverse war on terror context, it 
basically leads to the latter. This can be seen in the working of individual 
doctrines such as Bivens and in the combined impact of the totality of 
doctrines discussed here on would-be plaintiffs. 
If one accepts Pushaw’s analysis, the de facto abdication I have 
suggested here runs counter to established constitutional tradition. It also 
virtually eliminates the role of the civil suit as an accountability 
mechanism. The plaintiff files a complaint, often with fanfare, thus 
presenting some information, but a threshold dismissal eliminates the other 
stages. Pushaw’s approach at least gives us information, justification, and 
evaluation, even though the evaluation apparently always tilts strongly 
towards the government. “[M]ilitary or foreign affairs decisions that 
allegedly violate individual legal rights . . . are judicially reviewable, but 
under standards that resolve every doubt in favor of the validity of the 
government’s action.”410 Merits decisions might accord more weight to 
defenses such as necessity and self-defense, thus providing a form of 
guidance. If the defendant wins, there is no sanction or compensation. One 
might view the present array of doctrines as a blunt instrument that 
deprives the civil suit of almost all its utility. Pushaw’s more nuanced 
approach has a twofold advantage: the judicial process is not eliminated as 
an accountability mechanism, and the potential shift in emphasis to the 
merits permits more stages of accountability to come into play. Of course, 
to reach this point, it would be necessary to rethink the doctrines that 
currently block reverse war on terror suits at the threshold. Such a 
development may be occurring with the state secrets privilege, for 
example, but for it to happen across the board would represent a significant 
doctrinal shift. A broader pro-plaintiff shift cannot be ruled out, for 
example, with respect to issues such as immunity and Bivens. However, the 
continuation of a high degree of deference leading to dismissal seems 
likely. 
As noted, the desirability of deference is a matter as to which opinions 
differ sharply. Scholars have argued that normal standards of judicial 
review should apply to any examination by courts of actions of the political 
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 410. Pushaw, Judicial Review, supra note 401, at 1199.  
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branches.411 There is force to the contention that judicial review is 
especially important in national security issues. The risk is great that the 
political branches will diminish the importance of civil liberties in times of 
a crisis such as the war on terror.412 It is at such moments that the 
independent Article III judiciary plays a particularly essential role as the 
only branch that can ensure a balance of constitutional values. Indeed, the 
textual foundations of national security deference are weaker than the 
functional ones. The fact that the Constitution grants the political branches 
a number of powers in this area413 should not distinguish it from other 
areas where the Constitution grants powers. As for the judicial branch, all 
it has under the Constitution is the ability to hear cases and controversies 
that fit within the judicial power conferred by Article III.414 The question is 
whether the nature of the national security powers assigned to the political 
branches calls for a different approach to judicial review of their exercise.  
Still, the notion of national security deference is deeply ingrained in our 
constitutional tradition. Its institutional foundations make sense, as ably 
demonstrated by Professor Pushaw.415 The question that arises is whether 
things have changed with the Court’s decisions in a series of “enemy 
combatant” cases since the onset of the war on terror.416 These cases have 
arisen in the context of petitions for habeas corpus. The Court, as Professor 
Pushaw puts it, “interpreted the habeas corpus statute generously,”417 even 
to the point of distortion.418 On the other hand, the substantive results 
represented a mixed bag of defects and victories for the President. “[T]hese 
three cases did not necessarily signal a major shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence in which individual liberties will be upheld vigorously 
against executive claims of national security.”419 Professor Pushaw wrote 
these words before Boumediene v. Bush,420 in which the Court took on both 
political branches. Boumediene, far more than its immediate predecessors, 
might be seen as the case that broke the back of national security 
                                                                                                                     
 411. See Pushaw, supra note 392, at 1006 & nn.10–11, 1007, 1078 & n.339 (discussing 
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deference.421 The majority opinion emphasized the judiciary’s Marbury-
based role as the branch that says “what the law is,”422 echoing its earlier 
statement in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld423 that the Constitution “most assuredly 
envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake.”424  
On the other hand, it is possible to see Boumediene as resting primarily 
on the key role of habeas corpus. The Court proclaimed the writ’s 
“centrality,” noting that “protection for the privilege of habeas corpus was 
one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the 
outset, had no Bill of Rights.”425 I have raised elsewhere the argument that 
one should not extrapolate too far from the habeas cases, even if they are 
viewed as an assertion of the judicial role.426 Habeas raises the 
fundamental question of the lawfulness of executive detention and often 
presents the judiciary with familiar issues of the validity of procedures. 
Reverse war on terror suits would take the courts much further. 
Certainly, the Court’s two most recent war on terror decisions show a 
reluctance to go further and may even constitute a retrenchment. The 
importance of Ashcroft v. Iqbal427 has already been noted. Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project428 points in the same direction. Holder upheld a 
criminal statute that is a crucial component of the war on terror.429 It did so 
in the face of a vigorous First Amendment challenge, supported by three 
Justices.430 Both cases show deference toward the government and 
appreciation of the difficulties of waging the war on terror. Iqbal noted that 
“the Nation’s top law enforcement officers [were acting] in the aftermath 
of a devastating terrorist attack . . . .”431 Holder’s language is even 
stronger. The Court stated explicitly that deference was appropriate 
because “[t]his litigation implicates sensitive and weighty interests of 
national security and foreign affairs.”432 Indeed, the opinion went further—
endorsing the preventive approach to counterterrorism and recognizing the 
government’s need to often act “based on informed judgment rather than 
concrete evidence.”433 In perhaps the ultimate demonstration of the 
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importance of rhetoric, the Court’s opinion closed with a citation of the 
Preamble to the Constitution and its recognition of the need to provide 
“‘for the common defence [sic].’”434 Iqbal and Holder stand in stark 
contrast to the habeas decisions of a few years earlier. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The manner in which the Bush administration dealt with terrorism 
remains controversial; calls for an “accounting” continue. Yet, a “truth and 
reconciliation commission” along the lines proffered by Senator Leahy is 
not a realistic possibility, especially since many of the prior policies remain 
in place. At the moment, the most likely source of accountability is the 
judicial branch. Neither criminal prosecutions nor injunctive actions will 
play a significant role in this development. America’s default 
accountability mechanism will be the civil tort suit, usually based on the 
Bivens constitutional tort doctrine, brought by self-proclaimed victims of 
the war on terror.  
As this Article demonstrates, a host of judicial doctrines makes reverse 
war on terror suits hard to bring. Dismissal at or near the threshold is the 
likely result. The analysis posits two reasons, deeply rooted in the legal 
system, for this phenomenon: doubts about the tort suit as the means to 
effectively make policy through constitutional review and, more 
importantly, the role of national security deference in making it hard to 
bring suits that are, in effect, challenges to national security policies. This 
situation could change. Threshold doctrines such as the bar on Bivens suits 
that present “special factors counselling [sic] hesitation” could move in a 
pro-plaintiff direction. The result would be more suits, but deference might 
then come into play at the merits stage. This result, ironically perhaps, 
would be the unleashing of an accountability mechanism that provided a 
form of justification of what the Bush administration did. This may well be 
a desirable result, especially since so many of the former administration’s 
policies have been continued by its successor. The most likely present and 
future judicial scenario is an array of suits, most of which are dismissed 
well before the merits.  
Perhaps the judicial process is not the place to look for accountability. 
The emphasis on litigation seems to reflect the retributive motives that 
doomed the Leahy commission. Perhaps what is needed is a commission 
along the lines of the generalized, nonretributive model. It would look at 
past events more with a view to learning about them and from them than 
with a view toward making responsible parties pay. The accountability 
values of informing, justification, evaluation, and deterrence/compensation 
would be paramount. Compensation represents a separate issue and should 
be dealt with as such.435 Imposition of liability and sanctions on officials 
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would not be a priority.  
I have presented the Leahy proposal and the current civil suits as polar 
ends of a possible spectrum. It could include existing institutions such as 
congressional committees and inspectors general and new ones such as a 
body along the lines of the 9/11 Commission.436 The key point is that 
where a polity stands on the accountability sought with respect to any 
particular official action will be the dominant factor influencing the choice 
of accountability mechanisms to examine that conduct. In the anti-
terrorism context, let us identify the conduct as the Bush administration’s 
war on terror, particularly in its early years. Do we start from a 
presumption of unlawfulness and immorality, and thus focus on blame and 
liability? Or do we state the central question as how best to fight terror, and 
focus on past actions not because they are viewed as “wrong” but because 
they are the raw material from which we must work in developing future 
policies? These two ways of framing the central question will determine 
the accountability approach and the mix of institutions to achieve it. The 
retributive commission proposed by Senator Leahy and the adversarial 
civil suits being attempted with decidedly mixed results do not represent 
the only approaches to accountability. If they both turn out to be failures, it 
may be time to seek a different approach. 
                                                                                                                     
 436. The Commission’s mandate included the following purposes:  
 
 (4) make a full and complete accounting of the circumstances surrounding the 
attacks, and the extent of the United States’ preparedness for, and immediate 
response to, the attacks; and  
 (5) investigate and report to the President and Congress on its findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations for corrective measures that can be taken to 
prevent acts of terrorism. 
 
Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 602(4)–(5), 116 Stat. 
2383, 2408 (2002) (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. § 101 note (2006)). 
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